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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Importance ofModern Products Liability Law
Over the last two decades, due to our State's aggressive and capable
plaintiffs' bar, West Virginia has often been at the forefront of products liability
litigation. For example, just in relation to the pharmaceutical industry, West
Virginia has experienced major litigation in the last two decades concerning
prescription medications (Fen-phen, Vioxx, Risperdal, Lotronex, Digitek, Bay-
col, Rezulin, Paxil, Propulsid), breast implants, orthopedic implants, contracep-
tives, hormone therapy, transdermal patches, surgical sutures, and vaccines.
Obviously, products liability is an exceptionally important area of the law in this
state. And, due to the fact there has been substantial tort reform in other areas,
such as medical malpractice and insurance bad faith litigation, but not in relation
to products liability suits, we predict that the volume of products liability litiga-
tion will continue to increase.
B. Purpose and Scope of this Article
Despite the centrality of products liability litigation to West Virginia's
jurisprudence, there is a dearth of resources for lawyers who practice in this
field. The purpose of this Article is to assist lawyers litigating products liability
cases in state and federal courts in West Virginia by (1) setting forth West Vir-
ginia's substantive law governing products liability actions (Parts II-VII), (2)
collating and analyzing the leading products opinions that apply West Virginia's
substantive law (throughout), and (3) identifying issues that commonly arise in
the prosecution and defense of these cases (Part VIII).
We begin with two disclosures. First, we are trial lawyers, not scholars;
thus, we have relied heavily on the work of actual scholars, particularly Profes-
sor David G. Owen's Products Liability Law.' Although we have acknowl-
edged the direct quotations or references to Professor David G. Owen's horn-
book, Products Liability Law, that alone does not reflect this Article's substan-
tial reliance on his work. Second, we defend rather than prosecute products
liability cases. That said, we have tried to state what the law is rather than ad-
vocate what we think it should be.
I DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (2d ed. 2008).
2011] 421
5
Combs and Cooke: Modem Products Liability Law in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
C. Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.
Modem products liability law in West Virginia began in 1979 with the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in Morningstar v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co. 2 The core principles of Morningstar are the following: (1) a
product is defective unless it is "reasonably safe" for its "intended use;"3 and (2)
there are three principal theories of defect, i.e., a product may be defective due
to a defect in its design, manufacture, or "use" (warnings).4
Although decided more than three decades ago, Morningstar remains
the most important West Virginia products liability case, and, therefore, it is
necessary to review its holdings in detail.
Mrs. Morningstar's husband was injured when the safety guard failed to
close on his Black & Decker saw.' She sued, claiming a loss of consortium, and
the district court sought clarification from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals certifying the following question:
[W]hether or to what extent a third party, who has not con-
tracted to buy the product, can recover for personal injuries oc-
casioned by the product from the seller or manufacturer of the
product in a tort action. This discussion assumes the injured
party has no contract with the seller or manufacturer, and there-
fore enjoys no "privity" of contract.6
Thus, the case squarely presented the issue of whether privity of contract was a
potential defense in West Virginia.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, after disposing of several
procedural points, weighed the merits of three competing approaches to prod-
ucts liability law: (1) section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, (2)
Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, and (3)
2 253 S.E.2d 666, 678-80 (W. Va. 1979). An inquiry into pre-1979 products liability law is
beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, it is sufficient that prior to Morningstar prod-
ucts law in this state was based on negligence, warranty, and misrepresentation. Our courts, like
the courts of every other state, wrestled with the difficulty of applying these theories to products
cases, particularly when addressing issues such as privity of contract and contractual disclaimers.
West Virginia's substantive products liability law prior to the adoption of strict liability is tho-
roughly addressed in Professor Thomas C. Cady's Law ofProducts Liability in West Virginia, 74
W. VA. L. REv. 283 (1972), and Justice Miller's retrospective survey in Morningstar. On the
history of products liability law more generally, see OwEN, supra note 1, at 11-48.
3 Syl. pts. 4-6, Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 667.
4 See id. at 666.
Id. at 668.
6 Id. at 676.
[Vol. 113422
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the doctrine of "inherently dangerous products" established in Rylands v.
Fletcher.
The court reviewed these doctrines and carefully explained that the term
"strict liability" is a misnomer because the doctrine does not impose absolute
liability, nor does it make the manufacturer an insurer of its product.8 The court
noted that strict liability is fairer to the plaintiff than a negligence standard be-
cause it relieves the plaintiff from "proving specific acts of negligence" and
eliminates several potential defenses, including "notice of breach, disclaimer,
and lack of privity in the implied warranty concepts of sales and contracts."9
The court then reviewed its prior jurisprudence and noted that "privity
of contract was never a bar in this state to a tort action against the manufactur-
er."10 Although the court claimed that it was rejecting the tests set forth in the
Restatement" and Rylands v. Fletcher,12 and adopting the holding of Greenman,
v. Yuba, what the court actually did was graft section 402A's "reasonableness
requirement" into the Greenman v. Yuba standard:
4. In this jurisdiction the general test for establishing strict lia-
bility in tort is whether the involved product is defective in the
sense that it is not reasonably safe for its intended use. The
standard of reasonable safeness is determined not by the partic-
ular manufacturer, but by what a reasonably prudent manufac-
turer's standards should have been at the time the product was
made.
5. The term "unsafe" imparts a standard that the product is to
be tested by what the reasonably prudent manufacturer would
accomplish in regard to the safety of the product, having in
mind the general state of the art of the manufacturing process,
including design, labels and warnings, as it relates to economic
costs, at the time the product was made.
Id. at 668 (citations omitted). The court reviewed section 402A and found that it imposed
strict liability on a manufacturer "who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user ..... Id. at 676. The court then explained that Greenman v. Yuba, 59 Cal.
2d 57 (1963), removed the "unreasonably dangerous" prong and imposed strict liability when a
product "place[d] on the market ... proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 677. The court then found that Rylands v. Fletcher's doctrine of ab-
normally dangerous activities for the most part had not been applied in the products context. Id. at
684.
8 Id. at 677.
9 Id. (quoting Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 1967)).
o Id. at 680.
" Syl. pt. 7, id. at 667.
12 Syl. pt. 8, Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d. at 668.
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6. The question of what is an intended use of a product carries
with it the concept of all those uses a reasonably prudent person
might make of the product, having in mind its characteristics,
warnings and labels.13
In addition to adopting strict liability as a theory of recovery, Mor-
ningstar also established three categories of product defect: design, structural
(manufacturing), and use (warning):
We recognize that a defective product may fall into three broad,
and not necessarily mutually exclusive, categories: design de-
fectiveness; structural defectiveness; and use defectiveness aris-
ing out of the lack of, or the inadequacy of, warnings, instruc-
tions and labels.
Characteristically, under the first two categories of defective-
ness the inquiry centers on the physical condition of the product
which renders it unsafe when the product is used in a reasona-
bly intended manner. In the third category of defectiveness the
focus is not so much on a flawed physical condition of the
product, as on its unsafeness arising out of the failure to ade-
quately label, instruct or warn.14
Morningstar remains the leading case on products law in this state. In-
deed, the decision foreshadowed the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability section 2 published two decades later.15
Although strict liability is the most robust theory of products liability, it
was not intended to supplant the other causes of action, a point subsequently
made by the court:
Product liability actions may be premised on three independent
theories-strict liability, negligence and warranty. Each theory
contains different elements which plaintiffs must prove in order
to recover. No rational reason exists to require plaintiffs in
products liability actions to elect which theory to submit to the
jury after the evidence has been presented when they may elect
to bring suit on one or all of the theories.16
13 Syl. pts. 4-6, id. at 667.
14 Id. at 682.
is RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). This Restatement has not
been adopted in West Virginia, despite its fundamental similarity to the law and reasoning in
Morningstar.
16 Syl. pt. 6, Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 605 (W. Va. 1983).
424 [Vol. 113
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In addition to the three theories enumerated in Morningstar and Ilosky,
parties injured by a defective product in West Virginia may seek recovery pur-
suant to the theories of negligent or tortious misrepresentation.17 Each of these
four substantive theories is discussed below: strict liability, Part II; warranty,
Part III; negligence, Part IV; and misrepresentation, Part V.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF WEST VIRGINIA AS APPLIED TO THE THREE
STRICT LIABILITY CLAiMS ESTABLISHED BY MORNINGSTAR: DESIGN DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, AND USE DEFECT
As set forth above, Morningstar establishes the three substantive theo-
ries of strict liability products litigation. Relying on one (or more) of these theo-
ries, a plaintiff may file suit against any of the entities in the chain of distribu-
tion of a new product, even if that entity is not responsible for the defect. 8
A. Design Defect
1. Background
If the product is not reasonably safe for its intended use due to a specific
design flaw, then the product is defective.' 9 Historically, there were two major
analytical frameworks used to test design defectiveness: the consumer expecta-
tions test and the risk-utility test.20 As its name implies, the consumer expecta-
tions test focuses on whether the design meets the product user's reasonable
expectations. The risk-utility framework focuses on whether the product's de-
sign reasonably balances the risk of the harm and the costs of reducing that
risk.2 1
17 Wilson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 968 F. Supp. 296, 301 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
a Dunn v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151, 157 (W. Va. 1995). As stated by the
court:
Extending liability to those in the chain of distribution in this manner is meant
to further the public policy that an injured party not have to bear the cost of
his injuries simply because the product manufacturer is out of reach. The lia-
bility of a party in the chain of distribution is based solely upon its relation-
ship to the product and is not related to any negligence or malfeasance.
Id. Strict liability applies not only to the manufacturer, but also to the entities in the chain of
distribution. Id. This includes the reassembler, Yost v. Fuscaldo, 408 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1991);
the wholesaler, Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 1980); and the
retailer, Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982). Issues re-
lated to the chain of distribution are more fully addressed in Part VIII.
19 See Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 666.
20 OWEN, supra note 1, at 502.
21 "Costs," in this context, is much broader than financial cost and includes the calculus of the
following: the product's utility, the product's risk of injury, and the economic burden of reducing
the particular risk through design. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947). This calculus was most simply stated by Judge Learned Hand in the negligence con-
2011] 425
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Initially, the majority of courts used the consumer expectations test.
However, in the last thirty years, the broad majority of courts have shifted to-
wards some version of the risk-utility doctrine. 22 This shift makes sense, be-
cause the risk-utility analysis allows the fact finder to balance all of the compet-
ing interests encompassed in the design of the product and subsumes the con-
sumer expectations test, by incorporating the consumer's expectations into the
risk-utility calculus.2 3
West Virginia has followed the majority trend and adopted its own ver-
sion of the risk-utility test. As enunciated in Morningstar, West Virginia's test
requires the jury to determine the standards a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have employed to design the product at the time it was manufactured.24
The jury is further required to take into account industry standards, the general
state of the art at the time of manufacture, and the economic costs of making the
product safer.25
The term "unsafe" imparts a standard that the product is to be
tested by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would ac-
complish in regard to the safety of the product, having in mind
the general state of the art of the manufacturing process, includ-
ing design, labels and warnings, as it relates to the economic
costs, at the time the product was made.26
text, in this case. Id. As reformulated for the products context, the Hand Formula is B < P xL =
D. If the B (burden of eliminating a potential risk) is less than the P (probability of that loss)
times the L (magnitude of that loss) then the failure to adopt a design that eliminates that risk
constitutes D (negligence/defect). Id. This formula is very robust because it permits the fact
finder to balance potentially competing factors and to apply a different value to each factor in the
particular context of the specific product and harm that allegedly should have been eliminated
through better design. Id. The balancing of risk and utility also contemplates the practical situa-
tion where, if reducing or eliminating the risk also reduces or eliminates the utility of the product,
the result may be that the product ceases to exist at all and society would then be deprived of the
use of that product. For example, the utility of a knife is to cut, which also presents a risk of lace-
ration. If the design alternative eliminating that risk results in a dull knife blade such that it can no
longer cut, then the product cannot function as intended.
22 See OwEN, supra note 1, at 504-20 for an explanation of when and why this shift occurred.
23 See Syl. pt. 6, Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 667 ("The question of what is an intended use of
a product carries with it the concept of all of those uses a reasonably prudent person might make
of the product, having in mind its characteristics, warnings and labels."). "We acknowledge that
our definition of a defective condition differs from [the consumer expectations test] followed by
the California court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,[] 573 P.2d 443 (Ca. 1978), in that ours is
somewhat more restrictive." Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 680-81, 684 (citations omitted) (ad-
dressing Barker and consumer expectations).
24 Syl. pt. 4, Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 667.
25 Syl. pt. 5, id. at 667.
26 Syl. pt. 5, id. at 667, 682 ("We believe that a risk/utility analysis does have a place in a tort
product liability case by setting the general contours of relevant expert testimony concerning the
defectiveness of the product.").
426 [Vol. 113
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2. Elements of a Design Defect Claim
In West Virginia, the elements of a defective design case are as follows:
(1) that the product was not reasonably safe (2) for its intended use (3) due to a
defective design feature (4) which proximately caused plaintiffs injury.27 Pur-
suant to Morningstar, the first element, whether the product was "reasonably
safe," includes the sub-elements that (1) the safety is to be tested by the conduct
of a reasonably prudent manufacturer, (2) the relevant time period is the date of
manufacture, and (3) the risk-utility analysis is used to determine whether the
design was reasonable.28
3. Important Issues in Design Cases
Under Morningstar and subsequent West Virginia cases, there are a
number of important issues that frequently arise in defective design cases.
a. Necessity of an Alternative, Feasible Design
A threshold legal issue is whether the plaintiff, in her affirmative case-
in-chief, must prove that there is a feasible, alternative design that will eliminate
the risk and render the product "reasonably safe." In other words, can the plain-
tiff merely argue that the manufacturer's design was flawed or must she also
point to a feasible alternative design that appropriately eliminates that particular
risk?
This issue has received little attention from the court because, as a prac-
tical matter, plaintiffs counsel almost always put forth an alternative design
even in the absence of a requirement. The only West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals case addressing the issue is Church v. Wesson,29 in which the court in a
per curiam opinion upheld a directed verdict for the defendant, in a strict liabili-
ty context, on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish the feasibility of a
proffered alternative design.30
27 See id. at 666.
28 See Syl. pt. 4-6, id. at 687.
29 385 S.E.2d 393 (W. Va. 1989) (per curiam).
30 Id. Church is discussed and analyzed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
section 2 as follows:
In West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals has adopted the standard of
reasonable safety, as determined "by what a reasonably prudent manufactur-
er's standards should have been at the time the product was made." Mor-
ningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979) (em-
phasis added). This language can only be read to require the production of
evidence on reasonable alternative design, to gauge what "should have been."
[M]erely because a state recognizes the possibility that proof of a reasonable
alternative design may not be required in every case does not mean that such a
2011] 427
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b. State of the Art
Syl. pt. 5 of Morningstar states that the design process is to be judged
by the general state of the art in the industry as of the date of manufacture and
not by subsequent developments that improve that process.3' In many products
liability cases this will be the central dispute, i.e., whether the product was de-
fective when judged by the standards of the time of its manufacture.
c. Compliance With Safety Standards
The manufacturer may offer proof that the product complied with safety
standards as evidence that the design was reasonable.3 2 Such evidence is proper,
and may be considered by the jury, but is not conclusive on the issue of defect."
d. Inherent Risks
Many products contain inherent risks that simply cannot be eliminated
through design. In such cases, the product is not defectively designed by virtue
of the inherent risk.34 There are no cases from the Supreme Court of Appeals
that address this issue. However, two federal courts have predicted that the Su-
preme Court of Appeals will adopt this doctrine if the issue is presented to the
court.35
e. Optional Features
There is a split of authority on the issue of whether a manufacturer can
be held liable for designing a product that offers particular safety features as an
showing is not required in most cases. Thus, decisions in a number of juris-
dictions support the proposition that proof of a reasonable alternative design is
necessary as a general rule to support a claim for design defect, while recog-
nizing, in dicta, that there may be instances when a product has both such neg-
ligible utility and such a high degree of risk that, regardless of alternatives, the
product should not have been marketed at all. This position is reflected in § 2,
comment e and is perfectly consistent with this Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
31 Syl. pt. 5, Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 667.
32 Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28, 39 (W. Va. 1993).
3 Estep v. Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 672 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 2008); Johnson, 438
S.E.2d at 28; OWEN, supra note 1, at 95.
3 See OwEN, supra note 1, at 556; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i, j, k
(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. d (1998).
3 See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 477 (N.D. W. Va. 1989); Smith v.
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36option rather than as standard equipment. There are no West Virginia cases
that address this issue.
B. Manufacturing Defect (Structural Defect)
1. Background
The second category of defect established by Morningstar involves
"structural" defects, more commonly known as "manufacturing" defects."
Morningstar defines this category of defect as follows: "[W]hen a product
comes off the assembly line in a substandard condition it has incurred a manu-
facturing defect."3 8 Cases involving a manufacturing defect, flaw, or irregulari-
ty arising from errors in production are the simplest, least controversial area of
products liability. The theory behind these cases is very simple: manufacturers
and other suppliers should be liable for injuries caused by manufacturing defects
in the products they sell.
2. Elements of a Manufacturing Defect Claim
The elements of a manufacturing defect claim are as follows: (1) the
product was defective (i.e., not reasonably safe for its intended use) (2) due to a
manufacturing defect (3) present at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control and (4) which proximately caused plaintiff s injury.3 9
3. Defect Must Be Present at the Time the Product Left the Manu-
facturer
A principal issue in manufacturing defect cases is that the defect must
have been present at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. 40 For
example, in a case involving a missing or broken piece of safety feature, liability
can be imposed on the manufacturer only if the defect was present at the time
the product left the manufacturer. If the part was present when it left the manu-
facturer but was subsequently removed by a third-party, the manufacturer would
not be liable under a manufacturing defect theory.
36 See OWEN, supra note 1, at 558-66.
37 See OwEN, supra note 1, at 447.
38 Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 (W. Va. 1979) (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573
P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978)).
3 Id. at 680 ("Once it can be shown that the product was defective when it left the manufac-
turer and that the defect proximately caused the plaintiffs injury, a recovery is warranted absent
some conduct on the part of the plaintiff that may bar his recovery.").
40 Id.; OWEN, supra note 1, at 453.
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C. Use Defect (Failure to Warn Claims)
1. Background
Morningstar refers to the third category of defective product by the term
"use defectiveness." "Use defectiveness covers situations when a product may
be safe as designed and manufactured, but which becomes defective because of
the failure to warn of dangers which may be present when the product is used in
a particular manner."4 1 As pointed out in Morningstar, the analysis applicable
to use/warnings claims is fundamentally different from that used for design and
manufacturing cases because those cases focus on the physical condition of the
product, whereas a use/warnings claim focuses on the failure to instruct or warn
the user.42 The rationale for a warnings claim is that, even if a product is prop-
erly designed and manufactured, it may still be defective if the user is not prop-
erly informed of the product's risks.
2. Elements of a Warnings Claim
The elements for a warnings claim are as follows: (1) the product was
defective (i.e., not reasonably safe for its intended use) (2) due to an absent or
inadequate warning that a reasonably prudent manufacturer should have in-
cluded at the time the product was made and (3) which proximately caused
plaintiff s injury.
3. Important Issues
a. The Manufacturer Must Warn and, If Appropriate, In-
struct
Warnings claims encompass both "the duty to warn" (to inform buyers
and users of hidden dangers in a product) and the duty to instruct ("to inform
buyers on how to avoid a product's dangers in order to use it safely").43 An
example of this distinction would be in regard to tires. It is insufficient to mere-
41 Syl. pt. 2, Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 605 (W. Va. 1983).
42
Characteristically, under the first two categories of defectiveness the inquiry
centers on the physical condition of the product which renders it unsafe when
the product is used in a reasonably intended manner. In the third category of
defectiveness the focus is not so much on a flawed physical condition of the
product, as on its unsafeness arising out of the failure to adequately label, in-
struct or warn.
Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 682. A warning defect is a distinct claim, and should not be piggy-
backed on to a design or structural defect claim (i.e., product is defective in design and manufac-
turer at fault for not warning of the design defect). Id.
43 OWEN, supra note 1, at 584 (italics omitted).
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ly warn that an "overly inflated tire" poses the risk of explosion. The manufac-
turer should also instruct the user as to the tire's maximum permissible pressure
so as to instruct the user as to how he can avoid the risk of explosion.
b. The Duty to Warn Encompasses Risks Presented by Fo-
reseeable Uses of the Product
"For the duty to warn to exist, the use of the product must be foreseea-
ble to the manufacturer or seller."44 This requires the manufacturer to warn
against the risks presented by the product's intended use as well as other reason-
ably foreseeable uses or misuses.45
If the misuse was not reasonably foreseeable, then there is no duty to
warn. Typically, the question of whether a particular use was reasonably fore-
seeable would be resolved by the fact finder.4 6
c. The Warning/Instruction Must be Both Substantively
and Procedurally "Adequate"
The core of a warning claim is that the warning is in some manner subs-
tantively or procedurally "inadequate", which thereby renders the product defec-
tive.47
1. Substantive Adequacy
In order to be substantively adequate, the warning or instruction must
"clearly and comprehensibly describe the nature and degree of a product's spe-
cific risk."4 8 This concept conflates three ideas: (1) the warning must be ex-
pressed in clear and comprehensible terms, (2) the warning must describe with
reasonable precision the particular ways in which the product is dangerous, and
4 Syl. pt. 3, Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d at 605.
45 Id. at 609 ("The question of what is an intended use of a product carries with it the concept
of all those uses a reasonably prudent person might make of the product, having in mind its cha-
racteristics, warnings and labels.") (quoting Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 683 (emphasis added)).
Ilosky quotes with approval the following statement regarding foreseeability:
Foreseeability as applied to a manufacturer's products liability is a narrow is-
sue. A manufacturer must anticipate all foreseeable uses of his product. In
order to escape being unreasonably dangerous, a potentially dangerous prod-
uct must contain or reflect warnings covering all foreseeable uses. These
warnings must be readily understandable and make the product safe.
Id. at 610 (quoting Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980) (emphasis
in original)).
4 Id. at 610.
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(3) the warning must convey the degree of risk presented. 49 The warning must
describe all foreseeable risks presented by the product's intended use and rea-
sonably foreseeable misuses.so
2. Procedural Adequacy
Additionally, the warning must be procedurally adequate, i.e., "it must
be conveyed in such a form that it is likely to reach and be comprehended" by
the product's user.5 ' Procedural adequacy includes consideration of the warn-
ing's conspicuity and location. Conspicuousness depends on such factors as the
warning's type size, style, and color.52  Location emphasizes the physical
placement of the warning. In addition to textual warnings, important warnings
may also be conveyed through the use of pictograms. A critical external refer-
ence source regarding the procedural adequacy of a particular warning is wheth-
er it complies with the standards adopted by the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) or the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 3
3. Overpromotion
Several other jurisdictions have considered the issue of whether an oth-
erwise adequate warning can be eviscerated by contradictory safety claims or
conduct imputable to a defendant that undercuts the warning.54 An example is
Levey v. Yamaha Motor Corp.," in which the court found that the manufactur-
er's warnings and instructions were overridden by a salesman's demonstration
of the product which was contrary to the warnings.s6
49 Id
so Id. at 599.
s1 Id
52 Id.
53 ANSI is a voluntary organization that seeks to promote consensus standards. See AM.
NAT'L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). The European counter-
part is ISO. See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org (last visited Oct. 30,
2010).
54 OWEN, supra note 1, at 609
5 825 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
56 Id. at 556. Although it arises in a different context (using promotional literature to establish
foreseeable misuse), an analogous concept is set forth in Syl. pt. 8, King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387
S.E.2d 511, 513 (W. Va. 1989). In King, the court held that a manufacturer's promotional litera-
ture may be introduced as evidence that a particular use was foreseeable, despite the fact that the
injured party never saw the material and thus could not have relied upon it. Id If the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopts the concept of "overpromotion," a sub-issue will arise as
to whether the overpromotion must be communicated to the injured party, or whether overpromo-
tion in and of itself can be used to attack the warning. Logically, unless the overpromotion is
communicated to the injured person (or someone who communicates the overpromotion to the
injured person) it is not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
[Vol. 113432
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4. Warnings Pollution
Tension exists between the concept that a manufacturer must warn of all
specific risks and the reality that if too many warnings are included, the user
will be overwhelmed and less likely to heed those warnings that are most criti-
cal. This concept has been termed "information overload" or "warnings pollu-
tion."57 Typically, in warnings cases the plaintiffs expert advocates that a par-
ticular warning should have been included and the defense counters that to in-
clude all potential warnings would reduce the effectiveness of each particular
warning.
5. Promotional Literature
One issue that may arise in a use claim is whether the plaintiff may in-
troduce promotional literature to argue that the specific use the plaintiff was
engaging in at the time of the injury was foreseeable to the defendant. For ex-
ample, in King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp.,s9 the plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic
after he dove into a swimming pool that was four feet deep.60  The plaintiff
sought to introduce promotional literature from the manufacturer, which
"showed persons diving into similar Kayak-made, above-ground pools."61 The
defense objected, pointing out that the literature was outdated and that the plain-
tiff had never seen the promotional material at issue.6 2 The court rejected the
defense's claim and held: "In a product liability case, the manufacturer's adver-
tising or promotional material concerning the uses of the product are a part of
reasonable use of the product and may be admitted into evidence even though
the user is not aware of the material."63 The court then added: "Certainly, as
foregoing courts have recognized, the manufacturer's suggested uses for a prod-
uct contained in its advertising or other literature are admissible on the issue of
what is an appropriate, intended use of a product."6
5 See OWEN, supra note 1, at 611-13.
5 To avoid warnings pollution by certain industries, warning placement may be prescribed
and limited by regulatory agencies. For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration has specified that warnings relating to airbags be placed on the sun visors in automobiles.
Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 40 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2008).
9 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989).
6 Id at 513.
61 Id at 522.
62 Id
63 Syl. pt. 8, id. at 513.
6 Id. at 523.
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6. Defenses Solely or Primarily Applicable to
Warnings Claims
Fundamentally, a manufacturer is entitled to expect that a user will heed
the warnings and instructions provided with its product.65 In addition to this
fundamental principle, there are a number of specific, recognized defenses to
warnings claims.
a. Open and Obvious Danger
If the risk or danger is obvious or generally known, then the jury may
find that it is reasonable to assume that all consumers either know or should
have known about the risk and that the manufacturer is, therefore, excused from
warning about it.66 In Wilkinson, the court found that, in ascertaining whether a
duty to warn exists, "the fundamental inquiry is whether it was reasonably fore-
seeable that the product would be unreasonably dangerous if distributed without
a particular warning."67 This language suggests that, where the danger is com-
monly known, a warning is not required if the product is reasonably safe.
At this time, no opinion from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has expressly adopted the "open and obvious" defense in the products
context, although several federal courts have predicted that the court will adopt
the defense when the issue is presented. In Wilson v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,6 9 Judge Haden addressed this issue in the context of a loose
tobacco suit and found that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recog-
nized the open and obvious danger exception in premises liability cases 0 and
65 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
6 See 63A Am JuR. 2D Products Liability 1155 (2010) ("As a rule, there is no duty to warn of
dangers which are generally known and recognized. In other words, a product supplier cannot be
held liable for a failure to warn of dangers that are common knowledge to the public. This limita-
tion on the duty to warn. . . is recognized in the Restatement (Second) Torts as to both negligence
and strict liability. . . ."). Id. Ultimately, this is a causation analysis. If the consumer knew (or
should have known) of the risk, then the absence of a warning informing them of that risk did not
cause the injury.
67 Wilkinson v. Duff, 575 S.E.2d 335, 340 (W. Va. 2002) (emphasis added).
68 Wilson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 968 F. Supp. 296, 300-01 (S.D. W. Va.
1997) (Judge Haden finding that West Virginia appears to have adopted open and obvious danger
doctrine in a case involving loose tobacco); Robertson v. Morris, 546 S.E.2d 770, 774 (W. Va.
2001) (holding no duty to warn independent contractor of dangers that were "readily apparent" or
"common knowledge"); Huffman v. Appalachian Power Co., 415 S.E.2d 145, 153 (W. Va. 1991)
(holding no duty to warn trespassers of dangers that they "would be expected to discover"); but
see Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 76 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying West Virginia law
and concluding that Morningstar rejects the obvious danger doctrine because it declined to follow
the unreasonably dangerous requirement of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A).
69 968 F. Supp. at 300-01.
70 622 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 113434
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"that there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers present in products."7 Judge
Haden then found that this defense was available in West Virginia, but that the
facts of the case were not sufficiently developed to support it.72
Recently, Judge Chambers, in a polyvinyl chloride suit, agreed "that
West Virginia would adopt the open and obvious exception to a duty to warn in
the products liability context." 73 However, under the facts presented in that
case, Judge Chambers held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the de-
fense should apply to exposure to vinyl chloride monomer (the major raw com-
ponent of polyvinyl chloride):
[I]ts hazards may now be readily accepted in the scientific,
medical, and industrial communities, and known throughout the
workplace, at the time of exposure it could not be considered an
"open and obvious danger." Nor were the hazardous properties
of VCM readily apparent from simple observation of the chem-
ical, in the way of open and obvious hazards on the premises. 74
b. Warning Causation
The alleged defect must be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
This causation element is frequently hotly contested in warnings cases due to
the ephemeral nature of these claims. In Morningstar, the court implicitly ad-
dressed this issue holding that "[t]he seller is entitled to have his due warnings
and instructions followed; and when they are disregarded, and the injury results,
he is not liable." The court then expressly embraced warnings causation in
Tracy v. Cottrell.76
71 Wilson, 968 F. Supp. at 300-01.
72 Id.
73 Roney v. Gencorp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D. W. Va. 2009).
74 Id. at 503; see also Burdette v. Burdette, 127 S.E.2d 249, 252 (W. Va. 1962) (holding no
duty to warn of open and obvious dangers in trespass to land cases); Fox v. Martin, 453 S.E.2d
335, 339 (W. Va. 1994) (same); Robertson v. Morris, 546 S.E.2d 770, 774 (W. Va. 2001) (holding
no duty to warn independent contractor of dangers that were "readily apparent" or "common
knowledge"); Huffman v. Appalachian Power Co., 415 S.E.2d 145, 153 (W. Va. 1991) (holding
no duty to warn trespassers of dangers that they "would be expected to discover"); Higgins v.
Honda Motor Co., 974 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (applying West Virginia law and
holding that an all-terrain vehicle's lack of rollover protection is an open and obvious danger).
75 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979); see also
Singleton v. Int'l Harvestor Co., 685 F.2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law and
finding that plaintiff failed to prove that the inadequate warning was a but-for cause of the acci-
dent); Santos v. Ford Motor Co., 893 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (2010); Berger v. Ford Motor Co., 95
Fed. Appx. 520, 522 (4th Cir. 2004).
In Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1999), the West Virginia Supreme Court of
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Warning causation focuses on whether the user would have avoided
injury if the product had carried the plaintiffs proposed warning. In Wilkinson,
the court found that there was no proximate cause as a matter of law where the
prescriber already believed that prescribing the drug to someone in the plain-
tiff's condition violated the standard of care.77 The court found that the prox-
imate cause of plaintiffs harm was the prescriber's failure to obtain critical in-
formation from the patient, not any inadequacy of the product's label. Causa-
tion was independently defeated by prescriber testimony that "the labels pro-
vided by the manufacturer and distributor did not motivate his dispensing of [the
drug] to [plaintiff]."7 Similarly in Bertovich, a federal court applying West
Virginia law rejected claims based upon alcohol advertising, finding that "but
for" causation was not present where the plaintiffs did not allege "that they
themselves were deceived by, or even saw or heard, any of the [defendants']
advertising."7 9
In Rohrbough, a signed patient consent form, "acknowledging that
[plaintiff] had read certain forms describing the risks and possible side effects,
and that [plaintiff] nonetheless requested that the [product] be administered"
defeated a warning claim as a matter of law.8 0
Failure of an assembler to read warnings was suggested as a fatal defect
in Ilosky.8' The defendant sent warnings of the relevant risk to an "assembler"
who "failed to read it." 82 Where "warnings were given to the assembler and that
the assembler [acted] against the manufacturer's warnings, liability should fall
on the assembler rather than the manufacturer." 8 3 But,"determination of wheth-
In order to recover under a failure to warn theory, plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the lack or inadequacy of warnings in the
1988 Chevrolet Celebrity proximately caused Douglas Tracy's death. GM
may only be liable to petitioner for failure to warn where there is evidence that
a warning would have made a difference. Therefore, plaintiff must prove that
the lack of a warning regarding the seat belts in the 1988 Chevrolet Celebrity
proximately caused Douglas Tracy's death, and that the presence of a warning
would have prevented his death. Plaintiff must establish that the warning
suggested by plaintiff would have caused Douglas Tracy to act differently or
otherwise change his behavior in a manner which would have avoided his
death. If you find that a warning by GM would not have prevented Douglas
Tracy's death, then you must find in favor or GM.
Id. at 879 n.9.
n Wilkinson v. Duff, 575 S.E.2d 340, 341 (W. Va. 2002).
78 Id
7 Bertovich v. Advanced Brands & Importing, Co., 2006 WL 2382273, at *7-8 (N.D. W. Va.
2006).
8o Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D. W. Va. 1989).
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er a defendant's efforts to warn of a product's dangers are adequate is a jury
question."8
In two pre-KarlP5 medical learned intermediary cases, Pumphrey and Al-
len, the courts found "but for" causation lacking. In Pumphrey, the prescriber's
"considered judgment" to continue use of the product after signs that the risk at
issue was developing severed causation.8 6 In light of the prescriber's decision,
"[t]here [was] no evidence to show that the doctor would have heeded [a differ-
ent] warning of the manufacturer."87 In Allen, a case involving allegations of
improper drug promotion, the defendant's evidence that plaintiffs prescribers
"were not doctors to whom [defendant] had promoted [the drug]," combined
with plaintiffs failure to offer any contrary evidence, resulted in summary
judgment for the defendant.
In two post-Karl pharmaceutical cases, In re Zyprexa Products Liability
Litigation89 and Meade v. Parsley,90 the defendant obtained summary judgment
where there was no evidence that the plaintiff had ever read the package insert.
In Zyprexa, the court granted summary judgment because the defendant "was
entitled to expect" that the plaintiff would "read and understand" the drug's
labeling.91 Where the label went unread by the plaintiff, "there is no evidence
from which a jury could find that a different warning by [defendant] would have
prevented him from taking [the drug]."92 In Meade, the court found that post-
Karl, it was an open issue whether a drug manufacturer's duty to warn ran to
both the physician and patient or just the patient.93 The court found that under
the facts presented in Meade, it was unnecessary to resolve this issue because
the undisputed evidence showed that neither the patient nor the doctor read the
warning label prior to the patient ingesting the drug.94
Thus, defendants have prevailed on warning causation defenses under
the following circumstances: (1) failure of the plaintiff or intermediary to read
the challenged warning,9' (2) prior knowledge by the prescriber of the relevant
84 Id. at 611.
85 Johnson & Johnson v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007), is addressed in the next section.
86 Pumphrey v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 334, 339 (N.D. W. Va. 1995).
87 Id.
88 Allen v. Purdue Pharma., L.P., 2002 WL 32726841, at T5-6 (W. Va. Cir. June 26, 2002).
89 2009 WL 1514628 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying West Virginia law).
90 Meade v. Parsley, 2010 WL 4909435 (S.D. W. Va.) (Copenhaver, J.).
91 Zyprexa, 2009 WL 1514628, at *12.
92 Id.
9 Meade, 2010 WL 4909435, at *23.
94 Id.
9 See Zyprexa, 2009 WL 1514628, at *12; Meade, 2010 WL 4909435, at *23; Illosky v. Mi-
chelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983); and Bertovich v. Advanced Brands & Import-
ing, Co., 2006 WL 2382273 (N.D. W. Va. 2006).
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risk, (3) lack of reliance upon the manufacturer's warnings, (4) the prescrib-
er's/plaintiff s lack of exposure to the allegedly inadequate information,9 and
(5) signed patient consent indicating assumption of the risk.99
c. Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The "learned intermediary" doctrine is a defense that applies in the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in drug and medical device cases.'00
The theory of the defense is that due to the nature of the United States' health
care system, prescription drugs and medical devices are not dispensed directly
to the consumer, but rather must be purchased through an intermediary, the phy-
sician.
The federal courts that addressed this issue uniformly anticipated that
West Virginia would adopt the learned intermediary doctrine.o'0 However, in
2007 in the case of State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Karl,102 the West Virgin-
ia Supreme Court of Appeals, rejected these federal court opinions and held that
the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply in the case of prescription drugs
that are marketed directly to consumers, holding:
[U]nder West Virginia products liability law, manufacturers of
prescription drugs are subject to the same duty to warn consum-
ers about the risks of their products as other manufacturers. We
decline to adopt the learned intermediary exception to this gen-
eral rule. 0 3
In Karl, the plaintiff alleged that his mother died as a result of taking the
prescription drug Propulsid.1'" Plaintiff sued the manufacturer under a panoply
of products theories and filed a medical malpractice action against the physi-
96 See Wilkinson v. Duff, 575 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 2002); Pumphrey v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F.
Supp. 334 (N.D. W. Va. 1995).
9 See Wilkinson, 575 S.E.2d 335; Bertovich, 2006 WL 2382273.
98 See Allen v. Purdue Pharma., L.P., 2002 WL 32726841 (W. Va. Cir. June 26, 2002); Berto-
vich, 2006 WL 2382273.
9 See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 719 F.Supp. 470 (N.D. W. Va. 1989).
' OWEN, supra note 1, at 631 ("Sprouting in the 1960s, and becoming firmly planted in the
1970s the learned intermediary doctrine is an established fixture in American products liability
law, adopted now in a large majority of states.") (footnotes omitted).
10 See Johnson & Johnson v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 914 n.18 (W. Va. 2007) (citing Ashworth
v. Albers Med., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 395, 407 (S.D. W. Va. 2005)); Pumphrey v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
906 F. Supp. 334, 338 (N.D. W. Va. 1995); Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470,
478 (N.D. W. Va. 1989), ajJ'd, 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
102 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007).
103 Id. at 914.
104 Id. at 901.
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cian. 0 5  Prior to trial, the manufacturer filed a motion in limine asserting the
learned intermediary doctrine to bar the plaintiff from arguing that the manufac-
turer had a duty to directly warn the decedent, rather than her physician.10 6
After addressing procedural issues, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals squarely rejected the learned intermediary doctrine. 07  Initially, the
court reviewed the law in other jurisdictions and took issue with prior cases as-
sessing the general acceptance of the doctrine, ultimately concluding that the
doctrine had been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, but not an "over-
whelming majority."10 The court then addressed the policy justifications that
support the doctrine' 09 and concluded that these policy considerations were out-
dated due to the advent of direct-to-consumer marketing of pharmaceutical
products." 0 The court also addressed the difficulty in application of the excep-
tions to the doctrine and found that fairness required the duty to warn be im-




107 Id. at 914.
108 Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 902-04. Justice Davis reviewed prior decisions addressing the broad
acceptance of the doctrine, including, In re Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806-09 (E.D. Tex.
2002) (finding that forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had adopted the
doctrine); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 n. I1 (Conn. 2001) (finding that forty-four
jurisdictions had adopted the doctrine); and Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 768 n.3 (Ky.
2004) (thirty-four jurisdictions). Justice Davis then pointed out that in many of these states the
doctrine had been adopted by a lower court, but not by the highest court of that state. Karl, 647
S.E.2d at 902-04. By her tally the doctrine had been adopted by the highest courts of only twen-
ty-one states and one state by statute. Id. at 904.
109 As stated by the court in Karl:
Among the primary justifications that have been advanced for the learned in-
termediary doctrine are (1) the difficulty manufacturers would encounter in at-
tempting to provide wamings to the ultimate users of prescription drugs; (2)
patients' reliance on their treating physicians' judgment in selecting appropri-
ate prescription drugs; (3) the fact that it is physicians who exercise their pro-
fessional judgment in selecting appropriate drugs; (4) the belief that physi-
cians are in the best position to provide appropriate warnings to their patients;
and (5) the concern that direct warnings to ultimate users would interfere with
doctor/patient relationships.
Id. at 905.
110 Id. at 906.
Ill
Finally, because it is the prescription drug manufacturers who benefit finan-
cially from the sales of prescription drugs and possess the knowledge regard-
ing potential harms, and the ultimate consumers who bear the significant
health risks of using those drugs, it is not unreasonable that prescription drug
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Although Karl has established that the learned intermediary doctrine
does not apply in the context of pharmaceutical products that have been directly
marketed to consumers, it remains to be seen whether the doctrine will apply in
other contexts. For example, medical devices are rarely marketed directly to
consumers and are typically selected by the physician. It remains an open issue
whether the court will or will not apply the doctrine in regard to those actions.
d. Sophisticated User Doctrine
If a buyer/user of a product has particular expertise in the use of that
product, there may be no duty to warn. Again, this is a causation analysis. If,
due to the buyer's/user's expertise, he or she already possesses the substantive
knowledge that would have been imparted by the warning, then a failure to warn
of that risk would not be a proximate cause of a resulting injury.
The defense is rooted in section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, including comment n, which states the following:
[2] Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses
a supplier's potential liability for a "Chattel Known to Be Dan-
gerous for Intended Use." It proposes that liability will attach
when such a supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel
is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dan-
gerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dan-
gerous.
[I]t is obviously impossible to state in advance any set of rules
which will automatically determine in all cases whether one
supplying a chattel for the use of others through a third person
has satisfied his duty to those who are to use the chattel by in-
forming the third person of the dangerous character of the chat-
tel, or of the precautions which must be exercised in using it in
order to make its use safe. There are, however, certain factors
which are important in determining this question. There is nec-
essarily some chance that information given to the third person
will not be communicated by him to those who are to use the
chattel. This chance varies with the circumstances existing at
the time the chattel is turned over to the third person, or permis-
440 [Vol. 113
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss2/7
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LA WIN WEST VIRGINIA
sion is given to him to allow others to use it. These circums-
tances include the known or knowable character of the third
person and may also include the purpose for which the chattel is
given. Modem life would be intolerable unless one were per-
mitted to rely to a certain extent on others doing what they nor-
mally do, particularly if it is their duty to do so.112
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has cited section
388 and comment n, with approval in dicta, to date, the sophisticated user de-
fense has never been squarely before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals. In Ilosky, the court addressed a case in which the plaintiff crashed her
vehicle allegedly as a result of placing radial tires on the front axle and conven-
tional tires on the rear.113 The plaintiff argued that this incorrect installation
caused an unsafe oversteer condition and her wreck.1 4 In dicta, the court indi-
cated that the duty to warn might be satisfied by warning the product assembler
that installed the tires:
Where the ultimate user of the product claims that the "defect"
consists of a lack of adequate warnings or labels and the manu-
facturer can show that such warnings were given to the assemb-
ler and that the assembler utilized the component against the
manufacturer's warnings, liability should fall on the assembler
rather than the manufacturer." 5
In 2009, Judge Chambers, in Roney, discussed above, addressed the is-
sue of whether the court would adopt the sophisticated user defense before it
and more specifically, whether the court's decision in Karl, rejecting the learned
intermediary defense, also signals a rejection of the sophisticated user doctrine
in general."' 6  Ultimately, Judge Chambers distinguished Karl as "extremely
context specific," driven by the particular facts of direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing of pharmaceuticals, and found that it "is not applicable to a scenario outside
of the prescription pharmaceutical context and the rise of direct-to-consumer
advertising.""'7 The court then analyzed the issue as follows:
In deciding Karl, the court recognized that through such adver-
tising pharmaceutical companies had gained direct access to pa-
112 Roney v. Gencorp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503-04 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n. (1965)).
1" Illosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 607-08 (W. Va. 1983).
114 Id.
1" Id. at 610-11 n.8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n. (1965)).
116 See Roney, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
" Id. at 505.
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tients, a relationship starkly different than that which had ex-
isted when the doctrine was developed-when patients received
drug information exclusively through their doctors. Id. at 907.
At the time of Mr. Roney's exposure, the PVC [polyvinyl chlo-
ride] and VCM [vinyl chloride monomer] industries were much
more like the early pharmaceutical industry described in Karl.
Workers would have had little opportunity to influence the
choice of products to which they would be exposed. Instead,
they relied upon their employer to determine the scope of their
duties and the production process. They were insulated from
the manufacturer of the chemicals they used, much as the pa-
tient used to be insulated from the drug manufacturer. Because
it was based on reasoning entirely inapplicable here, the Karl
decision does not persuade the Court that West Virginia would
refuse to accept any form of the sophisticated user defense. It
does, however, counsel caution in adopting a version of the de-
fense which could be applied too broadly. It is the opinion of
this Court, based in part on the supreme court's signal in Ilosky,
that West Virginia would apply some version of the sophisti-
cated user defense.'18
Judge Chambers then looked to a trio of Fourth Circuit cases applying
Virginia law on the issue." 9 The court then concluded that the Oman-Willis
approach was superior to the Goodbar approachl 2 0 because it tied the defense
118 Id.
119 Id. at 505-07 (citing Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984);
Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 905
F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1990)).
120 As analyzed by Judge Chambers in Goodbar, the district court concluded that Virginia had
adopted comment n, and developed a balancing test to determine whether the supplier had a duty
to warn independent from that of the employer. Roney, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 505. The district court
then simplified the standard, holding that "if the danger related to the particular product is clearly
known to the purchaser/employer, then there will be no obligation to warn placed upon the suppli-
er ... when the supplier has reason to believe that the purchaser of the product will recognize the
dangers associated with the product, no warnings are mandated." Id. at 506 (quoting Goodbar,
591 F. Supp. at 561). The court then concluded that there was evidence in the record that the
employer was aware of the danger of silicosis, and that it would have been difficult for the bulk
supplier to have warned the employees, and thus found that the supplier had no duty to warn the
employees. Id. In Oman and Willis, the court applied the same balancing test but found that the
defense could not be relied upon in those cases. In Oman, the defense was found to not apply
because the product was "very dangerous;" the burden on the manufacturer in placing the warning
was small; and the employer had, in fact, not warned the employees. Id. In Willis, the defense
was found to not apply because although the court found that the employer had knowledge of the
product's dangers that "[t]he fact that an employer possesses knowledge of a product's dangers
does not extinguish the manufacturer's liability unless the manufacturer can show that it had rea-
son to believe the employer was or would be acting to protect the employees." Id. (quoting Willis,
905 F.2d at 797).
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more closely to the factors derived from comment n and focused "not on the
employer's knowledge but rather the reasonableness of relying on the employer
to generate or pass on warnings."l 2 ' Adding that the defense required the sup-
plier to prove that the employer had knowledge of the product's dangers, that
the supplier was aware of the employer's sophistication, and that it was reason-
able to expect the employer to pass on such warnings, Judge Chambers then
held that "West Virginia would allow an application of the sophisticated user
defense as described by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Oman and Willis
and as a factor to be considered in applying comment n of section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts."l
2 2
e. Bulk Supplier Doctrine
Another potential defense arising from section 388 comment n is the
bulk supplier defense which may apply if there is no way to warn of a product's
potential dangers due to the nature of the product or the way in which it is
sold.12 3 As explained by Judge Chambers, "While the sophisticated user defense
focuses on the reasonableness of reliance on the employer, the bulk user defense
concerns the burden which would be imposed on the supplier if it were bound to
directly warn all users."l 24
Relying on comment n, federal courts applying West Virginia law have
adopted the following six-factor test to establish this defense:
(1) the dangerous condition of the product; (2) the purpose for
which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given;
(4) the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary in-
formation about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk in-
volved; (6) the burden imposed on the supplier by requiring that
he directly warn all users. 12 5
Examples of products that would likely meet this standard include fung-
ible products such as gravel, sand, coal, etc., which are commonly sold in bulk
by tanker truck or rail car. In Roney, discussed above, Judge Chambers found
that West Virginia would adopt the bulk supplier defense in the context of a
vinyl chloride monomer case.12 6 Judge Chambers also cited with approval Vic-
tor E. Schwarz and Christopher E. Appel, Effective Communication of Warnings
121 Id. at 507.
122 Roney, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. (relying on Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 557; Oman, 764 F.2d at 233; and Willis, 905 F.2d
at 797).
126 Id. at 508.
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in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in Working with Industrial Materials,127
which describes the trend in the courts to bundle the bulk supplier and sophisti-
cated user defenses together.12 8
7. Adequacy is Typically a Jury Issue
In Syl. pt. 4 of llosky, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that "[t]he determination of whether a defendant's efforts to warn of a product's
dangers are adequate is a jury question." 2 9 Despite Ilosky 's categorical state-
ment, courts can and do grant summary judgment in warnings claims. 3 0 Addi-
tionally, even though our court has not addressed overpromotion or warnings
pollution, such issues would likely be factors that could be argued to the jury for
consideration in its calculus as to whether the warning was adequate.
8. Disclaimers are Prohibited
It is important that the practitioner distinguish between a warning and a
disclaimer. Whereas a warning seeks to warn the user regarding the danger of
the product, the disclaimer attempts to avoid liability by stating so.131
9. No Post-Sale Duty to Warn
West Virginia does not recognize a post-sale duty to warn of defects
that are discovered after a product leaves the manufacturer's control. In John-
son v. General Motors, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals expressly
declined the opportunity to impose this duty upon manufacturers. 13 2 While the
court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have recognized a post-sale duty in
various forms, the court noted that the boundaries of any such duty in West Vir-
ginia would be tied directly to the definition of a defect as set forth in Mor-
ningstar.133 Pursuant to Morningstar, the reasonable safety of a product is de-
termined by the state of the art at the time the product was manufactured.134 As
discussed above, the term "unsafe" imparts a standard that the product is to be
127 73 Mo. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (2008).
128 Roney, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 507 n.2.
129 Syl. pt. 4, Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 605 (W. Va. 1983).
130 Neary v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 460 S.E.2d 464, 469 (W. Va. 1995).
'1' See Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 1980) (same); Mor-
ningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 666 (W. Va. 1979) (no disclaimers permit-
ted).
132 438 S.E.2d 28, 39 (W. Va. 1993); see also Wilkinson v. Duff, 575 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va.
2002) (dismissing third party complaint against drug manufacturer asserting failure to warn
claims).
'3 253 S.E.2d at 666.
134 Id. at 682-83.
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tested by what the reasonably prudent manufacturer would accomplish in regard
to the safety of the product, having in mind the general state of the art of the
manufacturing process, including design, labels, and warnings, as it relates to
economic costs at the time the product was made. 135
Morningstar makes clear that the warnings that must be provided with
the product are determined by what the manufacturer knew, and what the gener-
al state of the art was, at the time the product was manufactured.1 36 If a product
was not defective at the time it was sold, under Morningstar, the later discovery
of new information that might arguably enhance the safety of the product cannot
form the basis to impose a duty to provide additional warnings.
III. THE APPLICATION OF BREACH OF WARRANTY TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA
A. General
The concept of warranty springs from contract principles embodied in
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). A "warranty" is an assurance or prom-
ise by one party concerning a fact upon which another party may rely. In the
context of the sale of goods, a "warranty" by the seller is an assurance to the
"buyer" that the goods will be of a certain quality or will perform in a certain
way. Generally speaking there are two types of warranties: express and im-
plied. Express warranties are made by some overt act of the seller, while im-
plied warranties are created by operation of law.1 37
Despite the theory's contractual underpinnings, West Virginia generally
abolished privity of contract in actions grounded on the breach of express or
implied warranty.13 8 Accordingly, today a West Virginia litigant who suffers
injuries as the result of a defective product may recover against a defendant
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer for breach of warranty without standing in
privity of contract with that party. However, the court recently clarified the
abolition of privity in a case involving a limited express warranty specifically
limited to the original purchaser.1 39
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See generally OWEN, supra note 1, at 148-52.
13 Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975).
139 McMahon v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., No. 35467, slip op. (W. Va. Nov. 24, 2010) (W. Va.
Code section 46A-6-108(a) does not apply to suits for breach of a limited
warranty by subsequent purchasers where the limited express warranty involved specifically limits
its availability to original purchasers. The court further stated,"[w]hile our holding in Dawson
would appear, at first glance, to apply to all express and implied warranties, we believe that the
application of the Dawson holding should be limited to actions that are essentially product liability
claims, consistent with the facts then before this Court. Nothing in Dawson or its progeny sug-
gests that our holding in Dawson should extend to the $49 consumer transaction between Advance
and Mr. McMahon or the subsequent motor vehicle transaction between Mr. McMahon and Ms.
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In addition to the sale of goods, a warranty may also be created in cer-
tain lease transactions of goods.14 0
As a general rule, the four-year statute of limitations under the UCC ap-
plies to an express or implied warranty claim.141 However, for warranty claims
involving personal injury, the two-year tort statute of limitations applies.14 2
B. Express Warranty
1. Background
An express warranty is an affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller of a good which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
parties' bargain.143 This concept is set forth in West Virginia Code section 46-
2-313, which states the following:
Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sam-
ple.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the ba-
sis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods
shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guaran-
tee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but
an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
John. To expand Dawson to Advance's limited express warranty herein would essentially have
this Court rewrite the stated limitation of the warranty itself and thereby rendering the bargained-
for limitations by the parties meaningless.").
' W. VA. CODE § § 46-2A-210 to -216 (2010).
141 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725 (2010).
142 Taylor v. Ford, 408 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1991).
143 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313 (2010).
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purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.'"
2. Important Issues
a. Form of the Affirmation
The affirmation at issue must be an affirmation of "fact."1 4 5
"[E]quivocal language is hardly an express warranty."l46 This affirmation can
be created in any manner. There is no requirement that it be in writing and it
can arise through oral or pictorial representations as well.
b. Falsity
In order to give rise to an express warranty claim, the specific affirma-
tion must be false.14 7 The code specifically exempts a seller's puffing because
such a statement is understood by the purchaser to be part of the sales process
and not an affirmation of fact. 148
c. Basis of the Bargain
In order to create a warranty, the affirmation must be part of the basis of
the bargain.149
1" Id.
145 Id. § 46-2-313(1)(a) (express warranty created by any affirmation of fact).
146 Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 477 n.3 (N.D. W. Va. 1989) (language
that frequency of risk is "unknown," but "seem[s] to be exceedingly rare" did not give rise to an
express warranty because it was equivocal). There must be evidence that the challenged statement
is "false." Id.
Manufacturers of products are not liable under a breach of warranty theory to
persons, who, having taken or received drugs, contract that which the drug
was designed to prevent, where brochures published by the manufacturer ...
contain no warranty, either express or implied, as to the absolute effectiveness
of the drug.
Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98, 100 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); see also id. ("virtually"
did not mean "absolutely").
147 Whittington, 333 F. Supp. at 100.
148 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313(2) (providing that an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty).
149 Id. § 46-2-313(1)(a).
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3. Important Cases/Treatises
An express warranty is created only when the affirmation of fact, prom-
ise or description of the goods is part of the basis of the bargain made by the
seller to the buyer about the goods being sold. 50
C. Implied Warranties
In product litigation, implied warranty claims tend to arise more fre-
quently. In addition to any "express" warranties provided by the merchant, the
product must be "merchantable." 15 ' For goods to be "merchantable," they must
be at least fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.152 For
example, the product must be substantially free of defects.153
1. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
a. Background
The "implied warranty of merchantability is an assurance, imposed by
law upon the seller, that a product is reasonably suitable for the general uses for
which it is purchased and sold."' 5 4 This warranty has been statutorily adopted in
West Virginia Code section 46-2-314, and it cannot be disclaimed. 5 5
b. Elements
The elements of an implied warranty of merchantability claim are as
follows:
(1) there must be a sale or lease; (2) by a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind; (3) merchantable goods must: (a) pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and (b) in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality
within the description; and (c) be fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used; and (d) run, within the varia-
tions permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and (e)
be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
15o Reed v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 426 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1992).
'1 W. VA. CODE § 46-2A-212 (2010).
152 Id. § 46-2A-212(2).
'53 Id.
154 OwEN, supra note 1, at 171.
'ss W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (2010).
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ment may require; and (f) conform to the promises or affirma-
tions of fact made on the container or label if any; and (4) un-
less excluded or modified, other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.156
C. Important Issues
1. Sale
In order for the warranty to arise, there must be a sale or lease of
goods. 157
2. By a Merchant with Respect to Goods of the Kind
Pursuant to West Virginia Code section 46-2-314(1), the sale must be
by a merchant with respect to the type of goods sold to the plaintiff.15 1
3. Defect
To prevail on a theory of breach of implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty, a plaintiff must establish that the product was not fit for the ordinary use of
that type of product.' 59 The requirement that a product be merchantable does
not mean that it must be perfect in every detail. To the contrary, a plaintiff may
only prevail on the theory of breach of implied warranty of merchantability by
proving that the product contained a defect that rendered the product not reason-
ably suitable for ordinary use. 60
d. Important Cases/Treatises
Evidence indicating that the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in
the design of the product is relevant to the issue of whether the implied warranty
of merchantability was breached.161
In order to recover under a breach of an implied warranty of merchanta-
bility theory, the plaintiff must prove the following by a preponderance of the
evidence: (a) the product was not fit for both the ordinary purposes for which it
156 Id.
157 Id. § 46-2A-210-16.




161 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (2010); id. at cmts. 1-13; Reed v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 426
S.E.2d 539, 539 (W. Va. 1992); Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1991);
Mountaineer Contractors v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 886 (W. Va. 1980); Jones, Inc.
v. W.A. Wiedebusch Plumbing & Heating Co., 201 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1973).
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was intended, as well as its reasonably foreseeable uses, at the time that it was
placed into the stream of commerce; and (b) the breach of warranty was a prox-
imate cause of the plaintiff s damages.16 2
2. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
a. Background
Whereas the implied warranty of merchantability ensures that goods are
fit for the general purpose for which they are sold, the implied warranty of fit-
ness for a particular purpose ensures that the goods are suited for a specific,
particular purpose. 63 This warranty is established by West Virginia Code sec-
tion 46-2-315:
Implied warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified un-
der the next section [46-2-316] an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
A warranty of fitness for particular purpose does not exist where the plaintiff
uses the product for only "its ordinary purpose."16 5
b. Elements
The elements of a claim for implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose are as follows:
(1) that the seller had reason to know that the buyer intended to
use the product for a particular purpose of which the seller was
aware; (2) that the seller had reason to know that the buyer was
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish a
product suitable for that purpose; (3) that the buyer did thereby
162 W. VA. CODE §§ 46-2-314 & -315 (2010); Jones, Inc., 201 S.E.2d at 248; Hill v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son. Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 1980); Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82
(W. Va. 1975).
163 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314.
' Id. § 46-2-315.
165 Wilson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 968 F. Supp. 296, 302 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
[Vol. 113450
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss2/7
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LA WIN WEST VIRGINIA
rely on the seller; and (4) that the product was not in fact fit for
the particular purpose.166
In order to recover, a plaintiff must prove that the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose arose in a transaction for the sale of
goods and that the lack of fitness for the particular purpose caused
plaintiff s harm.
IV. APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENCE TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS IN WEST
VIRGINIA
A. Background
Despite the ascendancy of strict liability and breach of warranty as the
principal theories in products liability actions, negligence remains a viable
theory. This point is made expressly in flosky, which states that negligence and
strict liability are independent theories that contain "different elements which
plaintiffs must prove to recover."1 6 7 Therefore, "[n]o rational reason exists to
require plaintiffs in product liability actions to elect which theory to submit to
the jury after the evidence has been presented when they may elect to bring suit
on one or all of the theories." 68
As strict liability evolves it has converged with negligence in its defini-
tion of defect. For example, Morningstar defines a defective product as "what
the reasonably prudent manufacturer would accomplish in regard to the safety of
the product." 69 Strahin v. Cleavenger defines the negligence standard as "that
level of care a person of ordinary prudence would take in like circumstances." 7 0
We asked plaintiffs' counsel who litigate product liability actions in
West Virginia why, given the advent of strict liability, they continue to assert
negligence claims in their products complaints. One answer is that they do so
because of a combination of the following factors: (a) negligence is conceptual-
ly simpler and more intuitive than strict liability, thus, enhancing jury appeal;
(b) the jury instructions given in a negligence case are simpler than the byzan-
tine strict liability instructions, again, enhancing the ease of proof; (c) the tech-
nical elements of a negligence case are simpler and better understood by trial
judges, thus, making it more likely they will survive summary judgment; and (d)
166 § 46-2-315; see also OWEN, supra note 1, at 182.
167 Syl. pt. 6, Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 603 (W. Va. 1983).
168 Id.
253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
170 603 S.E.2d 197, 205 (W. Va. 2004). The convergence of strict liability and negligence is
discussed extensively in OWEN, supra note 1, at 107-12. Owen points out that on a national level
the theory of negligence suffered a marked decline with the advent of strict liability but then be-
gan a "resurgence" in the 1980s. Owen further points out the similarity or "functional equiva-
lence" of the two theories in design and warnings cases. Id. at 108-09.
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in a case that is a realistic punitive damages candidate, they will attempt to
prove more than that the product was simply defective and will also be attempt-
ing to prove malicious and intentional conduct on the part of the manufacturer.
Therefore, the specific allegedly malicious and intentional acts will simulta-
neously support both their punitive case and their negligence case.
B. Elements
The elements of a negligence products liability claim the following: (1)
the manufacturer owed the consumer a duty to design/manufacture/warn regard-
ing the product, (2) the product was defective thereby breaching that duty, (3)
the breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries, and (4) the
plaintiff was injured.
C Issues
1. Need to Identify a Negligent Act
The obvious drawback for a plaintiff asserting a negligence claim is that
he must prove that the manufacturer committed a specific, negligent act, rather
than simply arguing that, regardless of the reason, the product was "not reason-
ably safe for its intended use."
2. Contributory/Comparative Negligence
In West Virginia, the defense of contributory negligence is void as
against the state's public policy 17 ' and has been replaced by the doctrine of mod-
ified comparative negligence. 172 As in strict liability, the comparative fault
(negligence) of the plaintiff reduces the verdict against the defendant unless the
plaintiffs percentage of fault equals or exceeds fifty percent as compared to the
fault of the defendants. 73 If the plaintiffs fault equals or exceeds fifty percent,
there is no recovery. 174
1' See Syl. pt. 3, Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1998) (pub-
lic policy of West Virginia bars the defendant from asserting the defense of contributory negli-
gence in a wrongful death case applying Maryland law, even though contributory negligence is a
complete bar under Maryland's law).
172 Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
1' King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989) (citing Adkins v. Whitten, 297
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3. Prima Facie Negligence
If a party can prove that the other party's conduct violated a statute or
regulation during the negligent act, it may give rise to a prima facie case of neg-
ligence.175 Of course, the converse is important also; compliance with a statute
or regulation in a product liability case based on negligence tends to affirmative-
ly demonstrate reasonable prudence.176
In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must
establish that there was a violation of a statute or regulation and that such viola-
tion was the proximate cause of his injury. 177 Assuming plaintiff meets this
burden, a prima facie case of negligence arises. This prima facie case may be
rebutted by evidence tending to show that the manufacturer "did what might
reasonably have been expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under
similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law."178 Frequently, the
defendant will attempt to prove that the alleged violation did not cause the plain-
tiff's injuries.
4. Res Ipsa Loquitor
Another issue that may arise in a negligence products liability case is
whether the plaintiff may rely on the existence of res ipsa loquitor to prove his
or her case. As discussed above, in a negligence case, a plaintiff "must prove,
with specificity, the manner in which the defendant was negligent in making or
selling the product that injured the plaintiff. Proof merely that a product mal-
functioned and caused an accident usually does not suffice." 79
However, there may be cases in which the plaintiff is unable to point to
the specific negligent act by the defendant, but may attempt to prove her case
through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor ("the thing speaks for itself"). As ex-
plained by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, res ipsa loquitor is an
evidentiary rule (not a rule of substantive law) in which "in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, . . . the mere fact that a damage-causing event occurs ...
suffices for liability." 80
' See Syl. pts. 2-3, Waugh v. Traxler, 412 S.E.2d 756 (W. Va. 1991); Syl. pts. 2-3, Spurlin v.
Nando, 114 S.E.2d 913 (W. Va. 1960). Under traditional terminology, such a violation was de-
scribed as negligence per se. See OwEN, supra note 1, at 86-95. However, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has made it clear that a statutory violation gives rise to a prima facie
case of negligence rather than negligence per se. Typically, prima facie negligence is asserted by
the plaintiff, but it is also possible for the defendant to argue that the plaintiffs violation of a
statute gives rise to a prima facie case of comparative fault.
176 Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 672 S.E.2d 345, 356-57 (W. Va. 2008).
177 Syl. pt. 2, Waugh, 412 S.E.2d at 756.
178 Id.
179 OWEN, supra note 1, at 96-97 (citations omitted).
180 Beatty v. Ford Motor Co., 574 S.E.2d 803, 807-08 (W. Va. 2002).
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The standard for proving res ipsa loquitor is set forth in Syl. pt. 4 of
Foster v. City of Keyser,' ' which states the following:
Pursuant to the evidentiary rule of res ipsa loquitur, it may be
inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negli-
gence of the defendant when (a) the event is of a kind which or-
dinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and
third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defen-
dant's duty to the plaintiff.
In applying this rule, the Foster court has stated accordingly:
It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference
may reasonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must neces-
sarily be drawn. It is the function of the jury to determine
whether the inference is to be drawn in any case where different
conclusions may reasonably be reached. 182
Further, the Beatty court stated the following:
In other words, the test set forth in Foster allows a trial court to
make a preliminary determination that the evidence that a plain-
tiff intends to present is indeed circumstantial evidence that will
lead to reasonable inferences by the jury, and is not simply evi-
dence which would force the jury to speculate in order to reach
its conclusion.1 83
Typically, it is difficult for a plaintiff to prove the elements of res ipsa
loquitor in a products liability case because there are usually alternative expla-
nations for the cause of the accident, including the possibility that the plaintiff
or a third-party misused the product. An illustrative case is Beatty v. Ford Mo-
tor Co.18 4 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he was driving a van "at approx-
imately 40 miles per hour when he heard a 'metal to metal' noise, and then im-
mediately lost control of the ability to steer" leading to a wreck. 8 5 When the
plaintiff exited the vehicle, he discovered that the "drag link" on the vehicle was
severely damaged.186 Plaintiff, acting as his own expert, claimed that a broken
181 501 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1997).
182 Id. at 185.
183 Beatty, 574 S.E.2d at 808.
"4 Id. at 803.
185 Id. at 805.
186 Id. at 806.
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drag link could not occur in the absence of negligence and, thus, constituted res
ipsa loquitor. Ford countered that there were alternative causes of the broken
drag link, including the impact forces of the accident.187 Under these facts, the
circuit court granted summary judgment and the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of prov-
ing that the drag link could not break in the absence of defect.' 88 The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor does not apply to warranty claims.189
V. ToRTIous MISREPRESENTATION
The torts of negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresenta-
tion/fraud remain important substantive theories in products liability litigation.
Surprisingly, very few cases from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals address misrepresentation in the products liability context. Despite the
paucity of reported cases, the tort is commonly alleged at the trial court level,
has been addressed by several federal courts applying West Virginia substantive
law,' 90 and has long been included in the Restatement of Torts.19'
The principle substantive difference between the torts of negligent and
intentional misrepresentation is, of course, the scienter requirement. It remains
an open issue whether liability can be imposed for an innocent misrepresenta-
tion in the products liability context;192 there are no West Virginia cases that
address this issue.19 3
' Id.
188 Id. at 808. Beatty also involved issues of whether the plaintiff could prove defect in strict
liability without an expert, through circumstantial evidence, a topic addressed in Part VIII.A.1.
The court found that under the circumstances of that accident, he could not, relying on a similar
analysis to the rejection of his res ipsa loquitor claim, i.e., that this is an accident that could have
happened in the absence of a defect, and thus expert testimony was required. See id. at 807. See
OWEN, supra note 1, at 96-107 for an extensive discussion of the elements and proof issues pre-
sented by res ipsa loquitor products cases.
189 Crawford v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 1960611, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. July 2, 2007).
190 Wilson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 968 F. Supp. 296, 301 (S.D. W. Va. 1997);
Baker v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 2002 WL 34213424 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2002).
191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 310-11, 402B (1963-64); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 (1963-64).
192 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310-11, 402B (1963-64); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 (1963-64).
193 See OwEN, supra note 1, at 139; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (1997).
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes a product-based claim for innocent misrepresenta-
tion:
b. Liability for innocent misrepresentation. The rules governing liability for
innocent product misrepresentation are stated in the Restatement, Second, of
Torts § 402B. Case law has followed that Section. Section 402B contains
two caveats. The first caveat leaves open the question whether a seller should
be liable under § 402B for an innocent misrepresentation that is made to an
individual and not to the public at large. This question remains open. Case
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A. Negligent Misrepresentation
1. Background
Misrepresentation has long been a basis for imposing liability in the
products context, as well as forming the basis of separate claims for causes of
action including, where applicable, warranty and contract claims. 194 The ratio-
nale for the tort of negligent misrepresentation is simple: if a seller negligently
misrepresents the product in question and those misrepresentations cause inju-
ries, the seller, as the party at fault, should bear the costs.
2. Elements
The elements for a claim of negligent misrepresentation are the follow-
ing: (1) an entity engaged in the business of selling or distributing products (2)
in connection with a sale of a product (3) made a misrepresentation (4) of a ma-
terial fact (5) that proximately caused (6) harm to person or property.195
3. Important Issues
a. Strict Liability
Strict liability concepts do not apply to a negligent misrepresentation as
the very nature of the claim requires the selling party to have negligently misre-
presented the product.
b. Materiality
In order for liability to be imposed, the misrepresentation must be in re-
gard to a material fact.' 96 If the misrepresentation concerns a non-material fact,
law on the subject of liability for innocent misrepresentation has dealt exclu-
sively with public misrepresentations. The second caveat to § 402B leaves
open the question whether a seller should be liable for an innocent misrepre-
sentation that causes harm to the person or property of one who is not a con-
sumer of the product. Case law has not resolved the issue of whether an inno-
cent misrepresentation may, in the absence of a product defect, be a basis of
liability to a non-consumer who suffers harm as a result of reliance by an in-
termediary.
Id. Of course, if the other elements were present, an innocent misrepresentation could give rise to
an implied warranty claim.
194 Wilson, 968 F. Supp. at 296; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 9 (1997); Alissa J. Strong,
"But he told me it was safe! ": The Expanding Tort ofNegligent Misrepresentation, 40 U. MEM. L.
REv. 105 (2009).
19s OWEN, supra note 1, at 133.
196 Id. at n.12.
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then liability will not be imposed because the misrepresentation would not be a
proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries.
c. Causation
In order for liability to be imposed, the plaintiff must have relied on the
misrepresentation and the misrepresentation must be the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury.' 97 A misrepresentation that does not lead to injury is non-
actionable.'"
d. Comparative Fault
As set forth in Part IV(C)(2), the ordinary principles of comparative
fault would apply. In other words, if the plaintiff is found to be fifty percent or
more at fault, there is no recovery.
B. Intentional/Fraudulent Misrepresentation
1. Background
The key importance of fraud as a legal doctrine is that, if proved, it
permits the plaintiff to seek enhanced remedies, some of which are not available
pursuant to any other products liability theory.
2. Elements
The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are as follows:
(1) a representation that is made in conjunction with the sale of a product, (2)
the representation was false, (3) the representation was material, (4) the speaker
had knowledge of the representation's falsity, (5) the speaker intended that the
representation be acted upon, (6) the purchaser was ignorant of the falsity, (7)
the purchaser reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation, and (8) the purchas-
er's damages were proximately caused by the misrepresentation.' 9 9
3. Important Issues
An extensive analysis of the tort of fraud is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. We will briefly mention some issues presented in the products liability
context.
197 Id. at 134; Meade v. Parsley, 2010 WL 4909435, at *27-29 (holding that reliance and prox-
imate causation are an element of all misrepresentation claims).
198 OwEN, supra note 1, at 134.
19 Martin v. ERA Goodfellow Agency, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 379, 381 (W. Va. 1992) (per curiam);
see also OWEN, supra note 1, at 115.
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a. Enhanced Pleading
Because an allegation of fraud can, in and of itself, be very damaging,
fraud claims must be plead with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 200 The rationale for this heightened pleading
requirement is to insure that fraud is not alleged without some evidentiary sup-
port and to permit the defendant to better prepare a defense.2 01
b. Standard of Proof
Fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.202
c. Representation of Fact Rather than Opinion




Fraudulent omissions are equally actionable.204
e. Reliance
The court in Lengyel v. Lint stated the following:
The complaining party must, generally, have relied upon the re-
presentation claimed to be false, but: It is not necessary that the
fraudulent representations complained of should be the sole
consideration or inducement moving the plaintiff. If the repre-
sentations contributed to the formation of the conclusion in the
plaintiffs mind, that is enough." 205
200 The Rule states in section (b): "Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind, negligence-In all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity." W. VA. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
201 See Hager v. Exxon Corp., 241 S.E.2d 920, 923 (W. Va. 1978); Pocahontas Mining Co.,
Ltd. P'ship v. Oxy USA, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 258, 260 (W. Va. 1998) (stating that an allegation of
"fraud is of such gravity that the strict requirements of Rule 9(b) were included to afford a party
charged with fraud an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense").
202 Syl. pt. 2, Nugen v. Simmons, 489 S.E.2d 7 (W. Va. 1997).
203 OwEN, supra note 1, at 122.
204 Smith v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 575 S.E.2d 419, 432 (W. Va. 2002) ("Fraud is the
concealment of the truth just as much as it is the utterance of a falsehood.").
205 280 S.E.2d 66, 69 (W. Va. 1981).
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Further, the court in Trafalgar House Construction, Inc. v. ZMM Inc., stated the
following: "If a plaintiff performs an independent investigation of facts which
are easily ascertainable, that plaintiff cannot later complain of detrimentally
relying upon fraudulent misrepresentations or concealment by the defendant." 20 6
f. Remedies Available
One major benefit of proving fraud rather than relying on a claim of
strict liability or negligence is that, if a party prevails on a claim for fraud, it
may ask the Court to award attorney's fees. "Where it can be shown by clear
and convincing evidence that a defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct
which has injured a plaintiff, recovery of reasonable attorney's fees may be ob-
tained in addition to the damages sustained as a result of the fraudulent con-
duct."207
g. Fraud on the Federal Drug Administration (FDA):
Claims Preempted
In drug and medical device cases, plaintiffs frequently attempt to claim
that the manufacturer withheld evidence from the FDA. Such claims are
preempted.20 8
4. Cases/Treatises
Although there are no West Virginia cases that apply fraud in the prod-
ucts context, the subject is treated extensively in Products Liability Law. 2 09
C. Consumer Fraud or Deceptive Trade Practices
Although outside the scope of this article, another component of the
products liability landscape in West Virginia is the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). 210 The WVCCPA prohibits the follow-
ing:
(L) Engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a like-
lihood of confusion or of misunderstanding;
206 567 S.E.2d 294, 300 (W. Va. 2002).
207 Syl. pt. 4, Bowling v. Ansted Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 425 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va.
1992); see also Eriksen Constr. Co., v. Morey, 923 F. Supp 878 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
208 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
209 OWEN, supra note 1, at 114-31.
210 W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-1-101 to -8-102 (2010).
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(M) The act, use or employment by any person of any deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation, or the
concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with
intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or
omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
goods or services, whether or not any person has in fact been
misled, deceived or damaged thereby.21 1
The WVCCPA provides for a private cause of action by "[a]ny person who pur-
chases . . . goods . . . and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another per-
son of a method, act or practice prohibited or declared to be unlawful by the
provisions of this article."2 12
As set forth above, the application of the WVCCPA is beyond the scope
of the article. However, it is essential for the practitioner to be familiar with this
statutory cause of action, the available remedies, and its application.
VI. DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA21
Rule 8(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates ni-
neteen affirmative defenses.2 14 In addition to these specifically enumerated af-
firmative defenses, there are numerous common-law defenses as well, some of
which apply to products liability cases.215
211 Id. § 46A-6-102(7)(L-M).
212 Id. § 46A-6-106(a).
213 Some of the "defenses" discussed in this section are not actually "defenses" but rather are
elements of the plaintiffs case, such as establishing jurisdiction or proving that the defendant's
conduct is because the proximate cause of the injury. We have chosen to address these issues in
this section since they will typically be raised by the defense even if they are not true affirmative
defenses. It is important to remember that, in a true affirmative defense, the defense has the bur-
den of proof whereas in these other "defense-like" contexts, the burden would remain with the
plaintiff.
214 Rule 8(c) states the following:
[A] party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankrupt-
cy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, sta-
tute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.
W. VA. R. CIv. P. 8(c).
215 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH LAW BOOK CO., WEST VIRGINIA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
HANDBOOK (Supp. 2009) (lists and discusses more than a hundred potential defenses); Robert L.
Massie, Products Liability Defenses, West Virginia, DRI-PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENSES at 15
(2004) (a state-by-state compendium).
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A. Defenses that are Per Se Void Pursuant to West Virginia Public Policy
These are some defenses that are per se void against the public policy of
this state and, therefore, may not be asserted in a West Virginia court even when
the court applies the substantive law of another state pursuant to lex loci delecti.
The most prominent of these forbidden defenses is classic contributory negli-
gence, in which, if the plaintiffs fault is a proximate cause of the accident, he or
she is completely barred from recovery.2 t6 Similarly, in a case involving Ala-
bama's substantive law, Judge Goodwin held that applying the learned-
intermediary defense in a pharmaceutical case involving a death alleged to have
resulted from a fentanyl transdermal patch contravened the public policy of
West Virginia.217
B. Defenses Related to Jurisdiction, Venue, and Service ofProcess
1. Jurisdiction in Products Cases
a. Background
Due to the global economy, many products used and sold in West Vir-
ginia are manufactured internationally. For this reason, products cases frequent-
ly examine the outer limits of the jurisdictional powers of West Virginia's state
and federal courts. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to comprehen-
sively address all of the issues related to jurisdiction in products cases, we will
briefly address the key concepts.
b. The Two-Step Analysis
Although this is a complex and fact-intensive area of the law, at least
the legal standard is clear:
A court must use a two-step approach when analyzing whether
personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation or other
nonresident. The first step involves determining whether the
defendant's actions satisfy our personal jurisdiction statutes set
forth in W. Va. Code § 31-1-15 [1984]218 and W. Va. Code §
56-3-33 [1984]. The second step involves determining whether
216 See Syl. pt. 3, Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1998) (pub-
lic policy of West Virginia bars the defendant from asserting the defense of contributory negli-
gence in a wrongful death case applying Maryland law, even though contributory negligence is a
complete bar under Maryland's law).
217 Woodcock v. Mylan, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Vitatoe v. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 2010 WL 1008788 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 5, 2010) (applying Louisiana law).
218 W. Va. Code § 31-1-15 was subsequently repealed and has been replaced by W. Va. Code
§§ 31D-1-101 to -17-1703 (2010).
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the defendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy federal due
process.2 19
1. West Virginia's Long Arm Statutes
The first step in the analysis requires the court to examine West Virgin-
ia's two long-arm statutes: West Virginia Code section 31D-15-1510 and West
Virginia Code section 56-3-33. If the plaintiff can establish jurisdiction under
either of these statutes, this prong of the analysis is satisfied.
West Virginia Code section 31D-15-1510 permits the service of process
upon a foreign corporation that has a registered agent. If the corporation has no
registered agent or its registered agent cannot be served after reasonable dili-
gence, then the foreign corporation may be served by registered mail or certified
mail addressed to the corporation's Secretary.22 0
Additionally, West Virginia Code section 56-3-33 permits the exercise
of long-arm jurisdiction when a defendant "(4) [c]aus[es] tortious injury in this
state by an act or omission outside this state if he or she regularly does or soli-
cits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this
state . . . ."221 These two long-arm statutes are intended to convey jurisdiction to
the full extent permissible under federal due process.222
2. Federal Due Process
The second prong of the analysis is whether the plaintiff can establish
general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.2 23 The crux of the analysis is
whether there are minimum contacts between the non-West Virginia defendant
and West Virginia such that it would be fair for the court to exercise jurisdiction
over the party at issue.224 Unfortunately, there is no clear guidance from the
United States Supreme Court regarding the issue of whether placing a product in
219 Syl. pt. 5, Abbott v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 444 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1994); see
also Syl. pt. 1, Lane v. Boston Scientific Corp., 481 S.E.2d 753 (W. Va. 1996).
220 Of course, all service of process upon foreign corporations that are signatories to the Hague
Treaty must comply with the provisions of that Treaty. See Part VI.B.2.b.3.
221 W.VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (2010).
222 Syl. pt. 2, CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, 441 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1994) ("[T]he rule in West Vir-
ginia will always be congruent with the outer edge of the due process envelope that, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States, circumscribes jurisdiction.").
223 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Specific jurisdiction involves the specific actions within the
forum state that led to the alleged injuries whereas general jurisdiction may be exercised over a
defendant whose "activities in the forum state have been 'continuous and systematic[.]"'
224 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (the "defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there").
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the stream of commerce is sufficient to convey jurisdiction over a product sup-
plier or manufacturer. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia,2 25 an evenly split Supreme Court addressed this issue and was unable to
reach a majority opinion.226 "At base, the Justices in Asahi unanimously agreed
that the defendant must have the purpose and intent to reach the forum state in
order for a court to assert jurisdiction over him." 22 7
c. Issues Related to Jurisdictional Litigation
1. Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Proof
As the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction
is proper.228
2. Component Parts
Federal judges in the Southern District of West Virginia have disagreed
over the emphasis to be given regarding whether the product is a component
part or a finished product. In Estes v. Midwest Products, Inc.,2 29 Judge Goodwin
engaged in an elaborate analysis, which emphasized that the defendant had
manufactured a "finished" product rather than a component part.2 3 0 However, in
Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,2 3 1 Judge Chambers held that there is no consti-
tutionally significant difference between component parts and finished prod-
ucts.232
3. Web Sites and Toll-Free Numbers
In Jeffers,233 Judge Chambers found that the fact the company had es-
tablished a website and a toll-free number did not convey jurisdiction (discussed
below).
225 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
226 id.
227 Estes v. Midwest Prods., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
228 Id. at 622.
229 Id. at 630.
230 id.
231 152 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
232 Id.
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d. Cases Addressing Jurisdictional Issues
Each case will turn upon the specific facts related to the distribution and
sale of the non-West Virginia defendant's product and whether the case is being
235
litigated in state or federal court. In Syl. pt. 2, Hill v. Showa Denko, K.K., the
court found that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Japanese manufac-
turer of L-tryptophan, which distributed its product through a wholly owned
American subsidiary.2 36 The court found that although the parent company did
not solicit business in West Virginia, the American subsidiary did.237 The court
further found that it was fairer for the parent company to be required to travel to
West Virginia for litigation as opposed to making an individual litigant travel to
Japan.238 It also found that the parent company benefitted from its contacts with
West Virginia.239 In conclusion, the court held, "We conclude that personal
jurisdiction 'premised on the placement of a product into the Stream of Com-
merce is consistent with the Due Process Clause,' and can be exercised without
the need to show additional conduct by the defendant aimed at the forum
state."240
In State ex rel. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen,24 1 the court determined that the
circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over an Australian sales agent (CSR
Ltd.) that sold asbestos to Johns-Manville Corporation for resale in the United
States.242 The court relied upon the fact that the sales agent introduced its fibers
into the stream of American commerce, knew that products containing fibers
would be distributed throughout the United States, had an ongoing commercial
relationship with the largest American manufacturer of asbestos products, and
was actively engaged in development and introduction of products that con-
tained its raw materials.243
In Estes,24 Judge Goodwin addressed the issue of whether a Missouri
based manufacturer of an air tank sold in a "West Virginia Kmart or Wal-
Mart"245 was subject to jurisdiction in the state. Judge Goodwin found that ju-
risdiction was appropriate:





240 Id. at 616 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987)).
241 441 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1994).
242 Id
243 Id
244 24 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
245 Id. at 622.
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Although its manufacturing operations are based in Missouri,
Midwest has structured its primary conduct so that its finished
products will be purposefully and intentionally sold in the state
of West Virginia. Its purpose and intent is revealed in the dis-
tribution scheme it has undertaken. Midwest does not merely
relinquish it [sic] products into the stream of commerce. Ra-
ther, by selling its products to consumers in this state through
national retailers, Midwest manifests its purpose and intent to
sell its air tanks here. The Court FINDS that Midwest has pur-
posefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of doing
business in the state of West Virginia and has established min-
imum contacts with the state such that jurisdiction may be as-
serted without offending traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.246
In Jeffers, 2 47 Judge Chambers addressed a products case that presented a
very interesting jurisdictional issue. 24 8 The plaintiff, an employee of Wal-Mart,
alleged that she was injured as a result of exposure to chemicals when she
cleaned up broken bottles of pesticide that fell from a shelf.24 9 The bottles were
distributed (and perhaps manufactured) by C. L. Smith, a Missouri corpora-
210tion.
Judge Chambers analyzed the jurisdictional issue and found that C. L.
Smith had none of the traditional contacts with West Virginia.2 51 However, the
company did have a national presence that necessarily included West Virginia
and which included features such as a world-wide web site that advertised its
product; a nationwide, toll-free telephone number; and advertisements in at least
one national trade journal.252
Obviously, C. L. Smith had placed its products in the stream of com-
mence. However, Judge Chambers found that C. L. Smith had designed a prod-
uct for a national market, and therefore, could be said to have availed itself of
"the entire nation as a market." 253
246 Id. at 622.
247 152 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
248 Id
249 Id. at 916.
250 id
251 Id at 922. It had never incorporated or registered to do business in West Virginia; never
owned or controlled any corporations, real property, or personal property in West Virginia; nor
had it ever had any bank accounts, employees, or telephone listings in West Virginia. Jeffers, 152
F. Supp. at 916.
252 Id. at 922.
253 Id. at 921-22 n.4. The Court states that there was
no evidence in this case that Defendant C.L. Smith's product was specifically
designed for the West Virginia market. Whether designing and/or manufac-
4652011]
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The court then found that there was no basis for specific jurisdiction,
and that the existence of the website, nationwide, toll-free telephone number,
and advertisement in a national trade journal did not convey general jurisdic-
tion.254
e. No Controlling Principle in Jurisdictional Case
Unfortunately, it is difficult to discern any controlling principles in the
jurisdictional cases. It is safe to say that state courts are more likely to find ju-
risdiction than the federal courts as a result of Hill's adoption of the stream of
commerce analysis. 255 Other than that, each case will turn on its particular facts.
2. Venue in Products Cases
a. Forum Non Conveniens
At common law, a defendant was permitted to move for a transfer of
venue pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, in which a court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, could "decline to exercise jurisdiction to pro-
mote the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice, even when jurisdic-
tion and venue are authorized by the letter of a statute."256 Although a prefe-
rence was given to the plaintiff's choice of forum, the "defendant may overcome
this preference by demonstrating that the forum has only a slight nexus to the
subject matter of the suit and that another available forum exists which would
enable the case to be tried substantially more inexpensively and expeditious-
ly."2 57 The framework for the substantive forum non conveniens analysis is set
forth in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Tsapis.2 5 8
turing a product in order to comply with national requirements (e.g., com-
pliance with federal labeling, packaging, or trademark laws; use of American
English labels; conformity with American consumer expectations as to pack-
age shape, size (in ounces, rather than liters), etc.), could be said to constitute
purposeful availment of the entire nation as a market, and thereby of every
state, while not decided by the Fourth Circuit, would seem to be inconsistent
with the result reached by that court in Lesnick.
Id.
254 Id.
255 Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 1980).
256 Syl. pt. 1, Abbot v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 444 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1994).
257 Syl. pt. 2, id.
258 400 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1990).
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b. Venue Statutes
1. Statutory Authority for Change of Venue
In Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson,259 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals abrogated the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
and held that the exclusive authority governing change of venue is West Virgin-
ia Code section 56-1-1(b), which states the following:
(b) Whenever a civil action or proceeding is brought in the
county where the cause of action arose under the provisions of
subsection (a) of this section, if no defendant resides in the
county, a defendant to the action or proceeding may move the
court before which the action is pending for a change of venue
to a county where one or more of the defendants resides and
upon a showing by the moving defendant that the county to
which the proposed change of venue would be made would bet-
ter afford convenience to the parties litigant and the witnesses
likely to be called, and if the ends of justice would be better
served by the change of venue, the court may grant the mo-
260tion.
Thus, under the terms of the statute, a motion for transfer of venue can
be made only if no defendant resides in the forum county and if the other factors
set forth in the statute (convenience of the litigants and the witnesses and better
suited to the "ends of justice") are met.26 One curious, "Alice in Wonderland"-
like interpretation of this statute is set forth in State ex rel. Huffinan v. Ste-
phens.262 In Huffinan, the Court found that, under the terms of the statute, a case
could be transferred under West Virginia Code section 56-1-1(b) only if it was
filed in the county in which the "cause of action arose."263 This leads to the
bizarre conclusion that if the case was filed in a county under which venue was
present under the terms of the statute, but that was not where the cause of action
arose, it could not be transferred from that county to the county where the cause
of action actually did arise.26
259 464 S.E.2d 763 (W. Va. 1995).
260 W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1(b) (2010).
261 See Syl. pt. 1, Riffle, 464 S.E.2d at 764 (West Virginia Code § 56-1-1(b) is the exclusive
authority for discretionary changes of venue). See also W. VA. CODE § 31D-1-140 (2010).
262 526 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1999).
263 Id. at 27.
264 This odd "change of venue" analysis does not preclude dismissal of the case if venue is
simply not present. W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1 (2005).
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Under the venue-giving defendant principle, if venue is proper for one
defendant, it will be deemed proper for all the defendants.265
2. Elimination of West Virginia Code Section 56-1-1(c)
In 2003, the Legislature adopted West Virginia Code section 56-1-1(c),
which sought to address forum shopping into West Virginia courts by adding
the provision that "a nonresident of the state may not bring an action in a court
of this state unless all or a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to
the claim asserted occurred in this state."266 However, in 2007 the Legislature
repealed subsection (c), thus removing the requirement that a substantial part of
the action arose in West Virginia.
3. Service of Process on Foreign Entities
Because many manufacturers are foreign corporations, issues arise as to
how these entities may be served. If a foreign defendant is from a country that
is a signatory to the Hague Convention,26 7 then service of process against that
268 ttthTdefendant is governed by the Treaty's terms. Pursuant to the Treaty, a party
is required, among other things, to send the complaint to the country's Central
Authority, and the complaint must be translated into the defendant's native lan-
guage.269
Because the Hague Convention is a federal treaty, its terms preempt in-
consistent provisions in West Virginia's long arm statute permitting service of
process by other methods.270 Additionally, a plaintiff may not achieve service
265 See McGuire v. Fitzsimmons, 475 S.E.2d 132, 137 (W. Va. 1996) ("'This Court follows the
venue-giving defendant principle, whereby, once venue is proper for one defendant, it is proper
for all other defendants subject to process."') (quoting Syl. pt. 1, Staats v. Co-Operative Transit
Co., 24 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1943)); Kenamond v. Warmuth, 366 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (W. Va.
1988); McConaughey v. Bennett's Executors, 40 S.E. 540, 541 (W. Va. 1901).
266 W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1(c) (2005). See Morris v. Crown Equipment Corp., 633 S.E.2d 292
(W. Va. 2006) (holding that subsection (c) did not apply to civil suits filed against West Virginia
citizens and residents and that the venue statute did not require the plaintiff to establish venue
against all defendants).
267 Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A.; see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 4, at 38 (West Supp. 2008).
268 Id
269 Id. Typically, plaintiffs counsel will either reach agreement with the foreign defendant to
accept service in exchange for other concessions in the litigation such as extending the time to
respond to discovery or will retain a third-party that specializes in service of process pursuant to
the Hague Convention to effectuate proper service.
270 Syl. pt. 5, Bowers v. Wurzburg, 519 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1999) (to the extent the service of
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on the foreign defendant by serving its American subsidiary if the two corpora-
tions maintain separate corporate identities.27 1
4. Service to Defunct Corporation through Insurance
Carrier
In State ex rel. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Stone,27 2 the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a defendant corporation, Earl B. Beach Company,
could be served in a mass asbestos case by virtue of service of process upon its
insurer, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty.2 73 The court remanded the case for reconsi-
deration 2 74 in light of its opinion in Robinson v. Cabell Huntington Hospital,
Inc.,275 in which the court held that in order for a liability insurer to receive ser-
vice, it must be authorized to do so by statute or by agreement.276
C. Defense Related to the Time in Which Suit Can be Filed
1. Statute of Limitations
a. Background
A statute of limitations imposes a certain amount of time following an
injury in which a plaintiff can file suit. For example, pursuant to the West Vir-
ginia Code section 55-2-12, a plaintiff can file a negligence suit up to two years
following his or her injury. The rationale for a statute of limitations is "to re-
quire the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time., 2 77
b. Analytical Framework for Determining when the Sta-
tute Begins to Run
In syl. pt. 5 of Dunn v. Rockwell, 278 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals established a five-step analysis that should be applied in order to de-
termine whether a matter is time-barred by the statute of limitations.279 In most
271 Knapp v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 60 F. Supp. 2d 566, 573 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (ser-
vice on "Yamaha USA" did not constitute service on "Yamaha Japan" since the two corporations
maintained separate corporate identities).
272 509 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va. 1998).
273 Id.
274 id.
275 498 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1997).
276 Id. at 33.
277 Syl. pt. 2, Perdue v. Hess, 484 S.E.2d 182 (W. Va. 1997).
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products cases, the statute begins to run on the date of injury.280 However, there
may be cases in which the plaintiff is either unaware they have been injured or
unaware of the identity of the party that caused the injury.28 1
In Hickman v. Grover,2 82 the court addressed a case in which the plain-
tiff was injured when an air tank exploded.283 Obviously, the plaintiff knew that
he was injured at the time of the explosion and two days later he learned the
identity of the manufacturer of the air tank.284 However, it was not until two
years after the explosion that plaintiff learned why the explosion occurred, i.e.,
that the air tank was allegedly defective.285 Based upon these facts, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals extended the discovery rule to products
liability cases and established the following analytical framework for determin-
ing when the statute begins to run:
In products liability cases, the statute of limitations begins to
run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should know, (1) that he has been injured, (2) the
identity of the maker of the product, and (3) that the product
had a causal relation to his injury.286
c. The Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Product Lia-
bility Actions
1. Strict Liability/Negligence
There is no specific statute of limitations governing tort actions such as
negligence or strict liability suits; therefore, these product liability actions are
governed by the two year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code
section 55-2-12 (personal actions not otherwise provided for). 2 87
280 Id
281 Id
282 358 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1987).
283 Id
284 Id. at 811.
285 Id
286 Syl. pt. 1, Hickman, 358 S.E.2d at 810; see also Chancellor v. Shannon, 488 S.E.2d I (W.
Va. 1997).
287 W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (2002).
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2. Warranty Actions
a. Personal Injury Damages
When a plaintiff sues for personal injuries damages based on a breach of
express or implied warranty, the two-year tort statute of limitations is applied
rather than the UCC's four-year statute.288
b. Damages to the Product Itself
If a plaintiff sues for property damage to the product itself, strict liabili-
ty does not apply unless the damage is from a "sudden calamitous event." 2 89
Therefore, most claims will be brought as a contract (five or ten-year statute of
limitations) or warranty claim (UCC four-year statute of limitations).29 0
3. Misrepresentation Actions
Causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and intentional misre-
presentation/fraud are also governed by the two-year statute of limitations set
forth in West Virginia Code section 55-2-12.291
d. Important Issues
1. Discovery Rule
The most significant statute of limitations issue typically litigated in
products cases is the application of the discovery rule. As set forth above, the
discovery rule addresses situations in which it is appropriate to excuse the plain-
tiff's failure to file within the statutory period.292
288 Armor v. Michelin Tire Corp., 923 F. Supp. 103 (S.D. W. Va. 1996); Taylor v. Ford Motor
Co., 408 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1991).
289 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 145 (4th
Cir. 1993).
290 Id. at 136; Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
291 See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12; Trafalgar House Constr., Inc. v. ZMM, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 294,
299 (W. Va. 2002) ("Under West Virginia law, claims in tort for negligence, professional negli-
gence, and misrepresentation (fraudulent or negligent) are governed by a two-year statute of limi-
tation."); Brown v. Cmty. Moving and Storage, 455 S.E.2d 545, 547 n.3 (W. Va. 1995) (per cu-
riam).
292 See Bennett v. Asco Services, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 2005). In Bennett, sixteen
months before plaintiffs amended their products liability suit to add the defendant, they were
given documents that identified the defendant as playing a role in the manufacture of the heat
sensors at issue. Id. Plaintiffs' experts identified the vehicle's heat sensors as a potential source
of plaintiffs' fire alarm malfunction. Id. Ultimately, the court found plaintiffs were not entitled to
the protection of the discovery rule and their claims were time barred. Id.
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2. Typically, the Date on Which the Statute Began to
Run Will be an Issue for the Fact Finder
Typically, the time when the statute begins to run, i.e., when the party
knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, the identi-
ty of the alleged tortfeasor, will be a jury issue.293 However, if there is no ques-
tion of material fact regarding the plaintiffs failure to comply with the statute of
- - 294limitations, summary judgment is appropriate.
3. Tolling for Compliance with the Medical
Professional Liability Act
Under the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA), actions must be
brought within two years of injury or within two years of the date on which the
patient discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the in-
jury.295 All actions must be brought within ten years.296 Under the MPLA,
plaintiffs must serve a Notice of Claim and Certificate of Merit at least thirty
days before filing suit.297 Compliance with this provision tolls the statute of
limitations.298
Despite finding that West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6 is clear and
unambiguous and requiring dismissal for noncompliance in State ex rel. Miller
v. Stone,2 99 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has declined to enforce
the statute in subsequent cases. In two cases in particular, the plaintiffs' failure
to comply with the prefiling requirements of the MPLA was impliedly allowed
to toll the statute of limitations. 300 In both Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc. and
Gray v. Mena, the plaintiffs failed to comply with these requirements, and their
complaints were dismissed by the circuit courts.3 0 1 Despite the noncompliance,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cases,
293 Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
294 See Workman v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, L.P., 2006 WL 1896609 (S.D. W. Va. July 10,
2006); Sayre v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 867 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. W. Va. 1994); Goodwin v. Bayer
Corp., 624 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 2005); Cecil v. Airco, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1992) (in a
case in which the name of the proper defendant was stamped upon the product at issue, summary
judgment regarding plaintiffs failure to identify the appropriate party within the statutory period
was appropriate).
295 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4(a) (2010).
296 Id.
297 Id. § 55-7B-6(b).
298 Id. § 55-7B-6(h).
299 607 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 2004).
3 Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 2007); Gray v. Mena, 625 S.E.2d 326
(W. Va. 2005).
301 See Blankenship, 656 S.E.2d at 459-60.
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finding dismissal too harsh and directing the circuit courts to permit the plain-
tiffs time to comply with the MPLA's requirements, effectively ignoring the
statute of limitations.302
At this time, it is impossible to state whether these two cases represent a
rule because the court provides no explanation or principled legal basis for the
decisions. In each case, the court explains that the requirements of the MPLA
were relatively new, and it is possible that the cases simply represent an ad hoc
exception to the statute that will no longer be applied now that the MPLA has
been in place for a number of years.303 Perhaps these decisions simply reflect
the court's reluctance to affirm dismissal of actions for failure to comply with
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6(b). 30
4. Tolling Due to Fraudulent Concealment
West Virginia tolls the statute of limitations for fraudulent concealment.
"Whenever a plaintiff is able to show that the defendant fraudulently concealed
facts which prevented the plaintiff from discovering or pursuing the potential
cause of action, the statute of limitation is tolled." 305
5. Persons Under a Disability
a. Minors
Pursuant to West Virginia Code section 55-2-15,306 the statute of limita-
307tion is tolled for infancy and insanity. When a person is an infant or insane,
he/she must file the lawsuit: (1) within two years after he/she has attained the
age of majority or becomes sane; and (2) within twenty years of the date of the
wrongful act and injury.308 "The general purpose of West Virginia Code section
55-2-15 (1923) is to toll the commencement of the running of the statute of limi-
302 Id.; Gray, 625 S.E.2d at 332.
303 See Blankenship, 656 S.E.2d at 459-60; Gray, 625 S.E.2d at 332.
3 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(b) (2010); Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387 (W. Va. 2005)
(holding that dismissal of complaint without an opportunity to remedy non compliance with W.
Va. Code § 55-7B-6 was a "draconian remedy" not intended by the legislature). See also Westmo-
reland v. Vaidya, 664 S.E.2d 90 (W. Va. 2008); Roy v. D'Amato, 629 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 2006);
Boggs v. Camden Clark Memorial Hospital, Inc., 609 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 2004).
305 Syl. pt. 5, Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255 (W. Va. 2009).
306 W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (2010).
307 Id.
308 Id.; see also Fugate v. Borg Textile Corp., 881 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1989); Albright v. White,
503 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1998); Donley v. Bracken, 452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994) (discovery rule
does not generally apply to extend the twenty-year limitation on cases brought by infants and
incompetents under section 55-2-15).
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tations so that the legal rights of infants and the mentally ill may be pro-
tected."o0
b. Insanity/Incompetency
As stated above, the statute of limitations is tolled for insanity by virtue
of West Virginia Code section 55-2-15.3I0
Although a determination of whether a person is a minor is relatively
uncomplicated, the determination of sanity is more problematic. For purposes
of defining "sanity," the fact finder must use the definitions set forth in West
Virginia Code section 2-2-10(n),3 1 1 which defines an insane person as follows:
"'[t]he words 'insane person' include everyone who has mental illness as de-
fined in [] [W. Va. Code section 27-1-2].",312 "'Mental illness' means a manife-
station in a person of significantly impaired capacity to maintain acceptable
levels of functioning in the areas of intellect, emotion, and physical well-
being."3' The court has further defined the term insane as encompassing "'such
a condition of mental derangement as actually to bar the sufferer from compre-
hending rights which he is otherwise bound to know."'
3 14
An additional issue is determining when the insanity arose. If the per-
son was insane at the time the cause of action accrued, the determination is easy.
The more difficult case arises when the person is sane at the time the tort occurs
and subsequently goes insane. For example, in Worley the plaintiff was fully
competent at the time of injury, but as a result of his injuries became incompe-
tent several days later. The defendant moved to dismiss, claiming the plaintiff
had missed the statute of limitations. At syl. pt. 4, the court found that the sta-
tute is tolled if the plaintiff can prove that "the interval between the tortious act
and the resulting mental illness was so brief that the plaintiff, acting with dili-
gence, could not reasonably have taken steps to enforce his or her legal rights
during such interval."
Finally, should a committee be appointed to handle the incompetent
person's affairs this will, as a technical matter, remove the disability and stop
the tolling of the statute of limitations.1 The timeliness of the committee's
3 Syl. pt. 3, Worley v. Beckley Mech., Inc., 648 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 2007).
310 W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15. See also Worley, 648 S.E.2d at 620; Cobb v. Nizami, 851 F.2d 730
(4th Cir. 1988) (patient who was in and out of mental institutions did not meet the statutory defini-
tion of insanity); Skeens v. Rebound, Inc., No. 3:05-0855, 2007 WL 2471605 (S.D. W. Va. Aug.
24, 2007); Harper v. Walker Mfg., Co., 699 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. W. Va. 1988).
311 W. VA. CODE § 2-2-10(n) (2010).
312 Worley, 648 S.E.2d at 624, n.3 (citing W. VA. CODE § 2-2-10(n)).
313 Id.
314 Id
315 Syl. pt. 4, Worley, 648 S.E.2d at 622 (citing W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (1923)).
316 See Dearing v. Dearing, 646 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
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actions will be judged based upon its reasonableness and diligence in discover-
317
ing the wrong.
c. Imprisonment does not toll the Statute of Limita-
tions
The statute of limitations is not tolled by virtue of the plaintiffs impri-
sonment. 3 18
6. Statutes of Limitations from Other Jurisdictions
The Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act, West Vir-
ginia Code sections 55-2A-1 to -6, provides that the statute of limitations appli-
cable to a cause of action "accruing outside of [West Virginia] shall be either
that prescribed by the law of the place where the claim occurred or by the law of
[West Virginia], whichever bars the claim."3 19
7. Savings Statute
Pursuant to West Virginia Code section 55-2-18, if an action is dis-
missed for some reason other than a resolution on the merits, then the statute of
limitations is tolled for one year to permit the case to be refiled.
Where a choice of law question arises whether the tolling provi-
sions of West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 55-2-18 [1985] or of the
place where the claim accrued should be applied, the circuit
court should ordinarily apply West Virginia law, unless the
place where the claim accrued has a more significant relation-
ship to the transaction and the parties.320
The court has taken an expansive view of section 55-2-18. In Davis v.
Mound View Health Care, Inc.,321 it applied the "plain language" of West Vir-
ginia Code section 55-7B-6 (2003) to affirm dismissal of the complaint. How-
317 Id. at 911.
318 See Tesack v. Waterford Park, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. W. Va. 1988).
3 Syl. pt. 2, McKinney v. Fairchild Int'l, Inc., 487 S.E.2d 913, 915 (W. Va. 1997) (pursuant to
W. Va. Code section 55-2A-2 (1959), the court applied Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations
rather than West Virginia's two-year statute).
320 Syl. pt. 5, id. at 915; see also Armor v. Michelin Tire Corp., 923 F. Supp. 103 (S.D. W. Va.
1996) (holding that Ohio savings statute did not apply because the accident occurred in West
Virginia); Weethee v. Holzer Clinic, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 19 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam) (remanding
case for determination of whether West Virginia or Ohio had more significant contacts for pur-
poses of determining which savings clause should apply).
321 640 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 2006).
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ever, because the dismissal order was silent as to whether it was with or without
prejudice, the court found the dismissal was presumed to be without preju-
dice. 32 2 The court then applied West Virginia Code section 55-2-18 and held
that because the dismissal was not with prejudice, the plaintiff had another year
from the date of its opinion to comply with West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6
and refile the action.323
8. Mass or Class Litigation
As plaintiffs' counsel increasingly seek to file products liability cases in
the form of mass litigation or class action litigation, issues will arise as to how
(and if) the court can apply the statute of limitations on a mass or class-wide
basis or whether the fact finder must make specific statute of limitations find-
ings on behalf of each plaintiff. Analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of
this article, but it is sufficient to say that serious constitutional issues arise that
will typically preclude the treatment of statute of limitations issues on a class-
wide basis. 32 4 A case that addresses this issue in the mass setting is In re Hear-
ing Losses I.325
2. Statute of Repose
A statute of repose is distinguished from a statute of limitations in that it
sets an absolute time bar by which a suit must be filed, regardless of the reason
for that delay.32 6 There is no general statute of repose that applies to products
322 Id. at 95.
323 Id
324 See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 149 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding class treatment
inappropriate because of individual issues such as causation, contributory and comparative negli-
gence and statute of limitations); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1081 (6th Cir. 1996);
Ardoin v. Stein Lumber Co., 220 F.R.D. 459, 465 (W.D. La. 2004) (finding plaintiffs failed to
satisfy even the light commonality burden, where individual issues abounded, including issues of
knowledge of risks of chromated copper arsenate treated wood); Jacobs v. Osmose, Inc., 213
F.R.D. 607, 614-16 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Badillo v. Am. Tobacco Co., 202 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D. Nev.
2001) (holding that individual issues about causation, comparative fault, assumption of risk, prod-
uct identification, and statute of limitations prevented class certification); Guillory v. Am. Tobac-
co Co., No. 97C8641, 2001 WL 290603 at *8 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 2001) (denying class certifica-
tion because it is impossible to determine what each plaintiffs subjective knowledge was without
mandating individual inquiry into each plaintiffs circumstances-denying defendants the oppor-
tunity to prepare a defense); Church v. Gen. Elec. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 169, 181-82 (D. Mass.
2001) (holding that class treatment is inappropriate because of individual issues of proof of nuis-
ance and trespass claims and possible defenses); In re Ford Motor Vehicle Co. Paint Litig., 182
F.R.D. 214, 220 (E.D. La. 1998) ("There is also no escaping the reality that causation, reliance,
damages and affirmative defenses relating to the state of the plaintiffs' knowledge . . . require
individualized determinations.").
325 539 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 2000).
326 OWEN, supra note 1, at 985-86.
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liability actions in West Virginia. There are a number of idiosyncratic statutes
of repose, including the architects' and builders' statute of repose,32 7 which bars
actions filed more than ten years after an alleged defect in the planning, design-
ing, surveying, or construction of a building;32 8 the tolling statute for infan-
cy/insanity, which specifically states that no case may be brought more than
twenty years after the cause of action accrues;3 29 the MPLA,330 which creates a
ten-year statute of repose for all medical malpractice claims, regardless of the
date of discovery, unless there is evidence of fraud concealment or misrepresen-
tation of material facts by the health care provider.3 3'
3. Laches
The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense that applies when delay
by the plaintiff would make it unfair or inequitable for the plaintiff to pro-
ceed.332 The elements the defendant must prove are "(1) lack of diligence by the
party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party assert-
ing the defense."333 Typically, a products suit is not an equitable act, and, there-
fore, laches will not apply. However, should a products suit seek equitable re-
lief such as unjust enrichment, then laches potentially will apply to that claim.
334
D. Superseding and Intervening Cause
Typically, if more than one person engages in conduct that is found to
be the cause of the plaintiffs injuries, these persons are considered to be con-
current tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff s damag-
es. 3 35 However, there are some situations in which the conduct of the subse-
quent tortfeasor serves to break the causal chain, creating an "intervening and
superseding cause," thus relieving the first party from liability.
327 W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (2008).
328 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Emerson Network Power, 695 F. Supp. 2d 308 (S.D.
W. Va. 2010).
329 § 55-2-15; see also Donley v. Bracken, 452 SE.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994) (upholding constitu-
tionality of the twenty year cap as reasonably related to the legislative goal of preventing stale law
suits); Albright v. White, 503 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1998)(same).
330 § 55-7B-4.
331 Syl. pt. 1, Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc., 487 S.E.2d 901, 906-09 (W. Va. 1997).
332 Syl. pt. 2, Ballard v. Kitchen, 36 S.E.2d 390 (W. Va. 1945).
Bradford v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 708, 714 (S.D. W. Va. 1984) (citations
omitted); see also Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255, 267 (W. Va. 2009).
3 Absure, Inc. v. Huffman, 584 S.E.2d 507, 511 (W. Va. 2003).
33 Syl. pt. 5, Kodym v. Frazier, 412 S.E.2d 219, 220 (W. Va. 1991) (quoting syl. pt. 1, Reilley
v. Byard, 119 S.E.2d 650, 650 (W. Va. 1961)).
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In order for an intervening cause to relieve a party of liability, the
wrongful act "must be a negligent act which constitutes a new effective cause
and operates independently of any other act, making it and it only, the proximate
cause of the injury." 3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a superseding
cause as "an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention pre-
vents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent neg-
ligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."3 37
There are numerous factors that may be considered in the determination
of whether an act constitutes a superseding cause. The West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals has identified foreseeability as the key factor in this
inquiry.3 39 Ultimately, the question of whether an act was a superseding and
intervening cause will be a question of fact for the jury "where the evidence is
conflicting or when the facts, though disputed, are such that reasonable [per-
sons] may draw different conclusions from them." 34 0 Although the doctrine of
superseding cause originally arose in the context of negligence, it "appl[ies]
equally to claims in strict products liability as well."341
336 Sheetz, Inc. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, PLLC, 547 S.E.2d 256, 270 (W. Va.
2001) (citing syl. pt. 3, Wehner v. Weinstein, 444 S.E.2d 27, 29 (W. Va. 1994)).
337 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965); see also OwEN, supra note 1, at 816-30.
338 The Restatement (Second) ofTorts states the following:
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an in-
tervening force is a superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) The fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from
that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the
event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances ex-
isting at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situa-
tion created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a
normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third per-
son's act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which
is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability
to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets
the intervening force in motion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965).
339 Harbaugh v. Coffinbarger, 543 S.E.2d 338, 345 (W. Va. 2000) ("[T]he test by which the
negligent conduct of one is to be insulated as a matter of law by the independent negligent act of
another, is reasonable unforeseeability'on the part of the original actor of the subsequent interven-
ing act and resultant injury.").
3 Sheetz, 547 S.E.2d at 270 (quoting Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Farmer, 133 S.E.2d 710, 711 (W. Va.
1963)).
341 OwEN, supra note 1, at 819.
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E. Defenses Related to Plaintiff Misconduct
In many products liability cases the defense contends that the plaintiff
misused the product, thereby causing his or her injuries. This defense is ex-
pressly recognized in Morningstar, which states the following: "The issue of
appropriate use of the product has as its counterpart the defense of abnormal
use, which may at times carry companion defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk on the part of the user."3 42 Although there is obvious
overlap in that these defenses focus on the conduct of the product user,
Contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are not
identical. The essence of contributory negligence is careless-
ness; of assumption of risk, venturousness. Knowledge and ap-
preciation of the danger are necessary elements of assumption
of risk. Failure to use due care under the circumstances consti-
tutes the element of contributory negligence.343
1. Comparative Fault
a. Background
At common law, the doctrine of contributory negligence was a complete
defense. In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,'" the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals modified the defense, holding that a party is not barred from
recovery as long as his contributory negligence does not equal or exceed the
combined negligence or fault of the other parties involved in the accident.345
"In mathematical terms, the plaintiff, in order to recover, cannot be more than
49 percent negligent. 34 6
b. Elements
The following are the elements necessary to show that the plaintiff bears
comparative fault: (1) plaintiff owed himself/herself a duty of care, (2) plaintiff
breached that duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.
342 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
343 King v. Kayak Mfg. Co., 387 S.E.2d 511, 515-16 (W. Va. 1989) (quoting Syl. pt. 5, Spurlin
v. Nardo, 114 S.E.2d 913, 915 (W. Va. 1960)).
3 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
345 Id. at 885.
346 Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1982) (citing
Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 887 n.19)).
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c. Important Issues
1. The Proper Scope of Comparative Fault
"Comparative negligence/fault is available as a defense . . . so long as
the [alleged breach of care] is not a failure to discover a defect or guard against
it." 347 This qualification was added because
to penalize a consumer for failing to discover defects or to
guard against them places a burden on the consumers which
strict liability was intended to remove . . . . Strict liability as-
sumes that products which are placed in the stream of com-
merce are safe . . . . Thus, there is no reason why a consumer
should be expected to inspect products for defects or to guard
against them.34 8
Under West Virginia choice of law, contributory negligence is void
against public policy. 34 9 Therefore, if injury happens in a state that has some
form of contributory negligence, under lex loci delicti, law of place of injury
applies; however, contributory negligence will not apply as it is void against
public policy. 350
2. Impact of the Age of the Injured Party for
Comparative Fault Analysis
The comparative fault analysis may be altered if the plaintiff is a minor
under the age of fourteen. Pursuant to the "Rule of Sevens," a child under the
age of seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence;351 children
between the age of seven and fourteen are presumed to be incapable of negli-
gence, but that presumption may be rebutted.352 Children over the age of four-
teen are presumed to be capable of negligence.353 The procedure, as explained
by the court, is as follows:
In order to rebut the presumption that a child between the ages
of seven and fourteen lacks the capacity to be negligent, evi-
dence of the child's intelligence, maturity, experience, and
347 Syl. pt. 5, Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d at 855.
348 Id. at 862.
349 Syl. pt. 3, Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 280, 280 (W. Va. 1998).
350 Id. at 282-83.
3 Syl. pt. 1, Pino v. Szuch, 408 S.E.2d 55, 56 (W. Va. 1991).
352 Syl. pt. 2, id at 56-57.
3 Syl. pts. 1-3, id. at 57.
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judgmental capacity must be presented to the jury. It is also
permissible to show that the child had been recently warned of
the dangers associated with the activity that gave rise to his in-
jury. The jury should be instructed about the rebuttable pre-
sumption and that it should consider the foregoing factors along
with the entire chain of events leading up to the accident to de-
termine whether the presumption has been rebutted.35 4
3. Assumption of the Risk
The rationale behind the defense of assumption of the risk is that if
someone knowingly uses a product while apprised of a risk of injury, it would
be unfair for that person to recover damages if he or she were injured. The crux
of the issue is the venturousness of plaintiffs conduct.355 There are two ele-
ments to assumption of the risk: (1) the nature and extent of the risk were fully
appreciated, and (2) the risk was voluntarily incurred.356
West Virginia has adopted modified comparative assumption of the
risk. It does not act as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery; rather the plain-
tiff's degree of fault is assessed by the jury and any damage award is diminished
accordingly.3 57 Unless the plaintiff's comparative fault is determined to be fifty
358percent or more, there is no recovery.
One issue that is frequently litigated in assumption of the risk cases is
the precise risk that must be appreciated. The cases examining this issue have
found that the key factor is whether the plaintiff was aware that there was a risk
of injury, not that the plaintiff knew of the precise defect and the precise risk
presented by that defect. For example, in Desco Corp. v. Harry W. Trushel
Construction Co.,359 the court found that the dangerous condition was the sto-
rage of flammable materials in a warehouse with an inoperable sprinkler sys-
tem.3 60 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that it was not aware of the
precise risk that caused the fire and held that "the precise cause of harm arising
from the risk need not be anticipated by the parties."361
An illustrative opinion in this regard is Circuit Court Judge Hoke's opi-
nion in Waller v. Ford Motor Co. 3 62 In Waller, the decedent was driving while
354 Syl. pt. 4, id. at 57.
35s Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 193 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1937); see also King v. Kayak Mfg.
Co., 387 S.E.2d 511, 515 (W. Va. 1989).
356 King, 387 S.E.2d at 517.
357 Syl. pt. 2-3, id. at 512.
358 Id.
3 413 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 1991).
360 Id. at 92.
361 Id. at 93.
362 Civ. Action No. 03-C-67, slip op. (Apr. 28, 2008).
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intoxicated from a large dose of prescription medication and was involved in an
accident; his vehicle caught on fire, and he perished. The plaintiff sued arguing
that the vehicle was uncrashworthy due to improper fire proofing and defects in
the fuel system.363 The plaintiff argued that an assumption of the risk instruc-
tion should not have been given to the jury because there was no evidence that
the plaintiff knew of the alleged defect,3 6 i.e., that the fuel system was allegedly
uncrashworthy. Judge Hoke rejected this argument and found that the key issue
was that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the risk of injury by operat-
ing a vehicle while intoxicated on prescription medication.6 The court stated
the following: "At the trial of this case, there was evidence that Mr. Waller ven-
tured out in his vehicle after having ingested an unusually large quantity of pre-
scription medication. The danger and risk he assumed, in this negligence and
strict liability case, was getting behind the wheel of a vehicle after doing so." 366
In In re Public Building Asbestos Litigation,367 the court addressed a
premises liability case in which there was evidence that the State of West Vir-
ginia had been aware for decades that asbestos was a hazardous substance, had
adopted regulations setting threshold limits for exposure to asbestos, and knew
that asbestos was in state buildings. However, the trial court refused (and the
Court of Appeals affirmed) to give an assumption of the risk instruction because
there was no finding that the state had actual knowledge that the asbestos limits
in some of its buildings were above the threshold limits.36 8 When the premises
owner is sued by an employee of the lessee,
the defense of assumption of risk is available to bar a claim
based upon a breach of a duty imposed by a statutory safety
scheme only where the defendant bears the burden of proving (1)
that there was available to the wage earner an alternative to en-
countering the risk; (2) that the wage earner's choice between the
risk and such alternative was fully voluntary; (3) that such alter-
native afforded the wage earner the safety mandated by statute,
rule, or regulation; and (4) that the wage earner's determination
to encounter the risk was, under the circumstances, made with
willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for his own safety.369
363 Id., slip op. at 2-3.
36 Id, slip op. at 10.
365 Id., slip op. at 10-12.
3 Id., slip op. at 10.
367 454 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1994).
368 Id. at 424.
369 Pack v. Van Meter, 354 S.E.2d 581, 588 (W. Va. 1986) (quoting Martin v. George Hyman
Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 74 (D.C. 1978)).
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F. Defenses Related to the Product Itself
1. State of the Art
Morningstar establishes that the relevant inquiry is whether the manu-
facturer fulfilled its duty in light of what was economically and technologically
feasible at the time the product was manufactured, and not whether the product
could have been made better or safer at some later date. 37 0 As long as the manu-
facturer's conduct was reasonable at the time of manufacture, a product is not
defective solely because subsequent improvements would render the product
safer.3 7 ' The state of the art defense applies to both design and warnings
claims.372
2. Inherently Dangerous Product
Some useful products are inherently dangerous and cannot be made safe
for their intended and ordinary use. Such products are not defective simply be-
cause they are dangerous, so long as they are properly designed, manufactured,
and accompanied by proper instructions and warnings. The concept of the inhe-
rently dangerous product has long been recognized in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, most prominently in comment k of section 402A. In Smith v. Wyeth
370 Syl. pt. 5, Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 667 (W. Va. 1979)
("The term 'unsafe' imparts a standard that the product is to be tested by what a reasonably pru-
dent manufacturer would accomplish in regard to the safety of the product, having in mind the
general state of the art of the manufacturing process, including design, labels and warnings, as it
relates to economic costs at the time the product was made."); Id. at 683 ("The standard of rea-
sonable safeness is determined . . . by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards should
have been at the time the product was made.").
371 See also Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E.2d 393, 396 (W. Va. 1989) (per curiam) (finding that
the evidence showed that welding process at issue was state of the art at the time of manufacture);
Estep, 672 S.E.2d at 356 (approving a state of the art jury instruction in the context of compliance
with federal or state law); OwEN, supra note 1, at 706-40.
372 Church, 385 S.E.2d at 396 (defendant entitled to judgment where the plaintiffs alternative
"was not feasible when the product was manufactured").
3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the following:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These
are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to
very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the dis-
ease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and use of
the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of
risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper direction and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dan-
gerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or un-
der the prescription of a physician. It is also true of many new or experimen-
tal drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
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Laboratories, Inc.,3 Judge Copenhaver was faced with a products suit alleging
that the DTP (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccine was dangerous. The
court found that, although the product presented risks, these risks were known
and inherent dangers of the product. Based upon this finding, the court pre-
dicted that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would adopt (or be
influenced by) comment k."' Examples of such products include firearms, ciga-
rettes, alcohol, and numerous others.376




The doctrine of preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution which states the following:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 37 7
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even the
purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing
and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with a qualification that they are properly prepared
and marketed, and proper warning is given, when the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (emphasis added).
374 1986 WL 720792 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
3 Id. at § 4-5; see also Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 477 n.1 (N.D. W.
Va. 1989) (predicts that it is likely the Court of Appeals would apply comment k "where a product
is proven to be unavoidably unsafe") (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 2 cmt. d (1998) ("[C]ourts generally have concluded that legisla-
tures and administrative agencies can, more appropriately than courts, consider the desirability of
commercial distribution of some categories of widely used and consumed, but nevertheless dan-
gerous, products"); OWEN, supra note 1, at 669-706.
376 See OWEN, supra note 1, at 676-706.
3n U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Consistent with that command, courts have long recognized that state
laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect."378 The theory behind
preemption is that federal law must be supreme or it would be trumped by a
myriad of state laws. An overview of preemption is far too large a subject for
this article so we shall simply discuss the basics as they apply to products lia-
bility law.379
b. The Three Types of Preemption
There are three basic types of preemption: (1) express preemption, (2)
implied conflict preemption, and (3) implied "occupation of the field" preemp-
tion.380 All federal laws are preemptive, regardless of whether they derive from
the Constitution, federal statute, treaty, or administrative regulation.
Analytically, express preemption is the simplest. Pursuant to the Su-
premacy Clause, state law must give way when the federal government has ex-
pressed an intent to preempt state law.38 1
Implied conflict preemption looks for an actual conflict between federal
law and state law.382 An actual conflict exists when either compliance with both
federal and state law is impossible or when state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."383
Implied "occupation of the field" preemption occurs when there is a
particular area in which Congress has made a determination that it is to be the
sole regulator. As stated by Laurence Tribe, in American Constitutional Law,
For if Congress has validly decided to "occupy the field" for the
federal government, state and local regulations within that field
must be invalidated no matter how well they comport with
substantive federal policies . . . . [But] federal occupation of a
field will not be lightly inferred: "The principle to be derived
from [the Supreme Court's] decisions is that federal regulations
of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of
state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-
either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
378 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
3 For an extensive analysis of preemption see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsrTuTIONAL LAW §§ 6-28 to -33 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter "TRIBE"].
380 Morgan, 680 S.E.2d at 84.
381 See TRIBE, supra note 379, at § 6-29.
382 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988); In re W. Va. As-
bestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d 818, 822 (W. Va. 2003).
383 Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so or-
dained."3 84
c. Significant Federal Cases
There are literally thousands of federal preemption cases so it would be
impossible to exhaustively survey this area of the law. For our purposes we will
discuss two cases that help show the interplay between preemption and products
liability.
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 3 Ms. Geier collided with
a tree while driving a 1987 Honda Accord.386 Geier and her parents sued vari-
ous Honda entities alleging that the subject Honda Accord was defective under
District of Columbia tort law due to the absence of a driver side airbag.*
Honda moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Geier's "no-
airbag claim" was preempted by the applicable version of Federal Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard 208 ("FMVSS 208").3" FMVSS 208 permitted manufac-
turers to choose from various different types of restraint systems, including the
use of airbags, to achieve compliance.3 89 Compliance with the FMVSS 208
did not require the use of airbags in any specific vehicle line. 390 The parties
agreed that the subject vehicle complied with FMVSS 208, notwithstanding its
lack of a driver side airbag.
Honda asserted that the "no-airbag claim" was preempted either ex-
pressly by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act's (Safety Act's)
stated preemption of state standards not identical to a Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard governing the same aspect of motor vehicle performance or
equipment, or impliedly because a verdict in favor of the Geier family would
conflict with the optional compliance framework of FMVSS 208.39' The Geier
family argued that the Safety Act's express preemption provision is limited to
state statutes and regulations and that common law claims are expressly pre-
served by the Safety Act's savings clause, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k),392 which states,
"[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standards . . . does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law."393
3 TRIBE, supra note 379, § 6-31, at 1205 (footnote omitted).
385 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
386 Id at 865.
387 Id.
388 Id. at 864-65.
389 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 29,008-10 (July 17, 1984).
390 Id
3 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 166 F.3d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
392 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) was recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (1994).
3 Geier, 166 F.3d at 1238 (quoting 15 U.S.C.§ 1397(k) (1988)).
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The trial court granted summary judgment for Honda, noting that the
"no-airbag claim" sought to establish a de facto safety standard that was differ-
ent than FMVSS 208-i.e., one that required the use of air bags-and was ac-
cordingly expressly preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).394 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed summary judgment, but
did so on the basis of implied preemption.3 95
Recognizing a clear split of authority between several federal courts of
Appeal, all of which recognized preemption of "no-airbag claims" and a collec-
tion of state courts, all of which found no basis for preemption, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 96 Analyz-
ing the issue of implied conflict preemption, the majority of the Geier court
found that NHTSA "deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of
choices among different passive restraint devices."3 97 The court noted that this
optional compliance framework was intended to further the safety objectives of
FMVSS 208 by permitting the introduction of different systems over time, the-
reby lowering costs, overcoming technical safety problems, and encouraging
technological development. 39 8
After reviewing the regulatory and judicial history of FMVSS 208, the
court analyzed numerous important considerations taken into account by the
applicable version of FMVSS 208. Specifically, the court discussed that while
airbags addressed some of the risks posed by an occupant's failure to use an
available seat belt, it did not address all such risks.39 9 The court further recog-
nized that airbags and other passive restraint systems pose their own unique
disadvantages and safety risks.400 Finally the court noted both the increased
costs that would be imposed by an airbag mandate and the related risk of public
resistance.40 1
The Geier court explained "FMVSS considered [the above] considera-
tions in several ways. Most importantly, that standard deliberately sought varie-
ty-a mix of several different passive restraint systems."402 The means for
achieving such desired variety was the establishment of a minimum perfor-
mance requirement and "allowing manufacturers to choose among different
394 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865; see also Geier, 166 F.3d at 1238 (explaining rationale and precedent
underlying trial court's decision).
395 See Geier, 166 F.3d at 1240-41 (discussing concerns with finding of express preemption,
but avoiding question due to clear presence of implied preemption); see also Geier, 529 U.S. at
865-66.
396 Geier, 529 U.S. at 866.
397 Id. at 875.
398 Id.
3 Id. at 877.
400 Id
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passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic belts, or other passive
restraint technologies to satisfy that requirement."40 3  The Geier court noted
that NHTSA had rejected a proposed standard that would mandate the use of
airbags in all vehicles due to "safety concerns (perceived or real)'404 associated
with their use. It also believed permitting a mix of devices would both facilitate
the development of data on comparative effectiveness and allow industry to
overcome safety concerns and high production costs.405 NHTSA hoped that the
optional compliance framework of FMVSS 208 would lead to "the development
of alternative, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems."406  In essence,
FMVSS 208 reflected NHTSA's policy judgment that safety would best be
promoted "if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their
fleets rather than one particular system in every car."407
Turning to the "no-airbag claim" asserted by the Geier family, the Geier
court reasoned that such a claim depended on the existence of a duty-i.e. a rule
of state tort law-requiring automobile manufacturers to install airbags at the
time the subject Honda Accord was manufactured. 4 08 By its terms, such a duty
would likewise have been applicable to manufacturers of all similar cars.4 09 By
mandating the use of airbags in all vehicles, this state law duty would have fru-
strated the objectives of NTHSA and presented an obstacle to the variety and
mix of devices deliberately sought by FMVSS 208.410 For that reason, the court
held the "no-airbag claim" to be preempted.4 1'
Geier establishes a framework for analyzing the preemptive effect of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards on state tort law claims. First, it clari-
fies the interplay of the Safety Act's preemption provision and savings clause.
In this respect, Geier rejects the argument that state tort law claims are subject
to express preemption under the Safety Act; however, it equally holds that the
Safety Act's savings clause does not insulate all common law claims from
preemption. Rather, traditional principles of implied conflict preemption apply.
Preemption is neither favored nor disfavored under the Safety Act.4 12 Geier
further instructs that the state of technology, comparative cost of alternatives
403 Id. (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 28,990, 28,996 (1984)).
404 Id. at 879.
405 Id. (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 28990, 29,001-02 (1984)).
406 Geier, 529 U.S. at 879.




411 Geier, 529 U.S. at 881-82 (citing Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 156 (1982), for the proposition that conflict preemption arises where state law limits the
availability of an option that a federal agency considers essential to ensure its ultimate objectives).
412 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869-74 (holding that Safety Act reflects a "neutral policy" toward the
application of preemption).
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and real or perceived safety concerns are all legitimate agency considerations
when formulating a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard. When NHTSA
determines that its legitimate concerns about safety, technological advancement,
and cost can be best promoted by permitting manufacturers to choose from
among expressly approved methods, its deliberate establishment and mainten-
ance of such an optional compliance framework is a means-related objective
found by the Supreme Court to be worthy of preemptive protection.
In Moser v. Ford Motor Co.,413 Judge Keeley applied Geier to conclude
that a plaintiffs suit challenging the type of seatbelt chosen by Ford in its 1990
Escort was similarly preempted.414
In Wyeth v. Levine,4 15 the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether a state
law failure to warn claim was preempted by FDA regulations. In Wyeth, the
plaintiff was injured when phenergan was improperly injected into one of her
arteries.416 She brought a state law failure to warn claim, alleging that the
drug's warnings did not adequately warn of this risk.417
In the preamble to a 2006 regulation governing the content and format
of prescription drug labeling, the FDA had stated that federal law establishes the
floor and ceiling of drug regulation and that "FDA approval of labeling ...
preempts conflicting or contrary State law."418 "The regulation also declared
that certain state-law actions, such as those involving failure-to-warn claims,
'threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency respon-
sible for evaluating and regulating drugs."419 The court refused to accept the
FDA's statement that its regulation preempted contrary state law decisions re-
garding labeling and found that this was inconsistent with Congress's purposes
as stated in the Act. The court further found that the manufacturer could comply
with both federal and state law because it could strengthen the warnings on its
products under "the changes being effected" provision of the FDA's regulations
prior to obtaining FDA approval, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), and that,
therefore, the failure to warn claim was not preempted.4 20
d. State Court Cases Applying Federal Preemption
Although preemption is ultimately an issue of federal law, it may, and
must, be raised in all state courts as well. Generally speaking, preemption is
disfavored by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as expressed in Syl.
413 2001 WL 936346 (N.D. W. Va. 2001).
414 Id. at *4.
415 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
416 Id. at 1191.
417 Id
418 Id at 1200 (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006)).
419 Morgan, 680 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200).
420 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196-97.
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pt. 3 of Morgan v. Ford Motor Co.4 2 1 "Our law has a general bias against
preemption. Preemption of topics traditionally regulated by states-like health
and safety-is greatly disfavored in the absence of convincing evidence that
Congress intended for a federal law to displace a state law."4 22
Morgan is the most recent significant products liability preemption de-
cision from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Morgan was in-
volved in a rollover crash during which his "left hand and left arm were ejected
through the broken tempered glass of the driver's side-door window and
pinched between the ground and the exterior of the door panel. Mr. Morgan
suffered a severe de-gloving injury to his left arm and hand as a result."423
Morgan sued, challenging the installation of tempered glass in the side windows
of the vehicle.424 Morgan's expert opined that "laminated glass, or some other
ejection-resistant side window glass or glazing-which was technologically and
economically feasible-should have been used, and would have prevented the
ejection of Morgan's arm through the driver's side window.',25
The manufacturer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting,
among other things, that Morgan's glass-defect claims were "impliedly
preempted by the Safety Act, and its implementing regulation pertaining to
glass/glazing ('FMVSS 205')."426
The circuit court found that the appellant's
claim of a glass/glazing defect in the subject vehicle relates sole-
ly to the choice of tempered glass over other permitted options,
and not to any application or specific design or manufacturing
defect in the glass/glazing present in the subject vehicle.' The
circuit court further found that FMVSS 205 'permits a motor ve-
hicle manufacturer to use one of several options for the materials
in side and rear windows, including glass-plastic, laminates, and
tempered glass' and found that Ford had used one of those op-
tional glazing materials-tempered glass-in the side windows
of the subject 1999 Ford Explorer.42 7
The circuit court interpreted Geier to mean that because FMVSS 208
was deliberately designed to provide manufacturers with safety options, a state
court defect action that might compel a manufacturer to choose one of those
421 680 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 2009).
422 Syl. pt. 3, id. at 80. Footnote 4 of Morgan lists numerous cases in which preemption was
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safety options over the others available under the regulation frustrated the feder-
al scheme and was, therefore, impliedly preempted by the federal regulation.42 8
"Applying this interpretation of FMVSS 208 in Geier to FMVSS 205 in the case
below, the circuit court below determined that: '[B]ecause tempered glass is a
permitted option for manufacturers to use in vehicle side windows under
FMVSS 205, the imposition of state tort liability based on the exercise of such
option would frustrate the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'429
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court's award of summary judgment and concluded that the state glazing claim
was preempted because "the NHTSA gave manufacturers the option to choose
to install either tempered glass or laminated glass in side windows of vehicles
[pursuant to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)] 205, permitting
the plaintiff to proceed with a state tort action would foreclose that choice and
would interfere with federal policy.A30 The key to the Morgan implied conflict
preemption analysis is its focus on product design choices or options that are
sanctioned by the applicable regulatory agency. As Justice Ketchum wrote,
FMVSS 205 permits the manufacturer to make a choice be-
tween available safety options for side-window glass; a design
defect claim would foreclose choosing one of those options. We
understand that the instant case seeks to impose liability for on-
ly one of the options allowed by FMVSS 205. But actions in the
courts of each of West Virginia's 55 counties could theoretical-
ly, one-by-one, eliminate all of the options offered under
FMVSS 205. In the worse case, regulation by juries could, in a
piecemeal fashion, eviscerate the unitary federal regulation and
leave manufacturers with no options for glazing materials in
vehicle side windows.431
2. Compliance with Governmental Standard
Morningstar holds that a manufacturer may present evidence that its
product complied with federal, state, or industry safety standards as relevant to
the issue of whether the manufacturer used due care and the state of the art at
428 Id
429 id.
430 Id. at 94-95.
431 Morgan, 680 S.E.2d at 94. However, with a nod to Justice Thomas' concurrence in Wyeth
v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1204, Justice Ketchum questions whether it is appropriate to find preemp-
tion based on an agency's "musings" about preempting state tort law, rather than regulatory op-
tions that more clearly have the force of law. Morgan, 680 S.E.2d at 92.
2011] 491
75
Combs and Cooke: Modem Products Liability Law in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the time of manufacture.4 32 This evidence is not conclusive proof that the de-
sign was reasonable, but rather one factor the jury can consider.433
In Johnson,4 34 the defendant argued that its product was not defective
because NHTSA did not require automobiles to be equipped with rear seat lap
and shoulder belts in 1978. The court rejected that claim and instead held the
following: "Therefore, in this case the federal motor vehicle safety standards
were admissible as evidence of whether a manufacturer's conduct was reasona-
ble; however, the jury did not have to find the manufacturer's conduct was rea-
sonable merely because it followed the federal motor vehicle safety stan-
dards."436 Similarly, in Estep,43 7 the court rejected the defendant's argument
that compliance with federal, state, or industry standard created a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness. 43 8 The court instead found that, although such
compliance is a factor for the jury to consider, it does not create a rebuttal pre-
sumption that the product is non-defective.439
3. Governmental Contractor Defense
a. Background
The governmental contractor defense applies to a manufacturer who is
manufacturing a product pursuant to requirements established by the govern-
432 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979).
433 Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln Mercury Inc., 672 S.E.2d 345, 357 (W. Va. 2008).
434 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993).
435 Id. at 39.
436 Id. (footnote omitted).
437 672 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 2008).
438 Id. at 357.
439 The instruction given by the lower court in Estep read as follows:
The Defendants in this case have asserted that their liability is determined in
the light of whether the product was reasonably suited for the purpose for
which it was intended in accordance with the generally accepted standards of
the industry, having due regard for the existent state of technology and the
state of art at the time the product was designed and manufactured. Industry
standards are not conclusive as to ordinary care in design or manufacture but
rather, are admissible evidence for your consideration.
Compliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statute or
administrative regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured and
prescribing standards for design, inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling or
warning or instructions for use of a product may be considered by you when
in [sic] determining the issue of product defect.
Id.; see also Doe v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (holding
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ment. Basically, the doctrine insulates a manufacturer from a design claim if the
design was pursuant to governmental specifications.
The leading case is Boyle v. United Technologies Corp."0 In Boyle, the
pilot of a Marine helicopter was killed when his helicopter crashed and he was
unable to escape from the helicopter after it landed in the ocean." 1 Suit was
filed by the decedent's representative alleging that the helicopter's design was
defective because the escape hatch opened out, rather than in, and thus was inef-
fective in a submerged craft due to the water pressure.442 The jury agreed and
awarded a substantial verdict which was subsequently overturned by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a "unique federal interest" applied to
the issue of whether civil liabilities could be imposed upon a contractor that was
fulfilling a federal procurement contract because, if so, the contractor might
"decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise
its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly af-
fected."444 Ultimately, the court held that "state law which holds Government
contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some cir-
cumstances present a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be dis-
placed.""5 The court further adopted the "scope of displacement" test and
stated that
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be im-
posed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned
the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States." 6
In Campbell v. Brook Trout Coal, LLC,"7 Explo Systems, Inc., a muni-
tions decommissioner, was granted a contract to decommission munitions.4 48
Plaintiffs sued, alleging they were exposed to tetryl, a toxin found in the muni-
tions. Explo removed under the federal officer removal statute" 9 and asserted
4 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
4' Id at 502.
442 Id. at 503.
44 Id.
44 Id. at 506-07
445 Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
446 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
44 2008 WL 4415078 (S.D. W. Va. 2008).
4 Id. at *1.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006).
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the federal contractor defense.4 50 Judge Copenhaver held that the removal was
proper based upon the assertion of the defense.45 1
VII. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN WEST VIRGINIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS
The topic of damages that are available in a products liability action is
too broad to fully address in this article. However, we will briefly address the
different remedies offered by the theories discussed in this Article.
A. Personal Injury Damages
Typically, products liability claims are brought by plaintiffs seeking
personal injury damages. All of the theories of products liability addressed in
this Article can serve as a foundation for personal injury damages. 452
A plaintiff is entitled to the past compensatory damages that he or she
proves by a preponderance of evidence to a reasonable degree of probability.453
These damages may include reasonable and necessary medical bills, lost wages,
pain and suffering, mental anguish, lost household services, and other damages
flowing from the injury.
In order to recover future damages, the plaintiff must prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that (1) he has suffered a permanent injury,454 and (2)
the damages must be proved to a reasonable degree of certainty.455 Future dam-
ages may include future medical bills, future lost wages, loss of earning capaci-
ty, future lost household services, and future pain and suffering, provided these
elements are proved with the requisite certainty.
Damages may also be awarded for the loss of consortium of a spouse,456
parent,457 or child. Loss of consortium is a "derivative" claim, the scope of
which "is defined by the injury done to the principal."# By their very nature,
loss of consortium damages are hard to define. Belcher specifies that loss of
450 Campbell v. Brook Trout Coal, LLC, 2008 WL 4415078, *7 (S.D. W.Va. June 19, 2009).
451 Id. In Virden v. Altria Group, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. W. Va. 2004), and Carter v.
Monsanto Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), the courts found that federal officer
removal was not available under the facts of those cases.
452 The exception is that there is no precedent permitting the recovery of personal injury dam-
ages pursuant to the WVCCPA, which is referenced but not addressed in this Article. See Part
V.C.
453 Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974).
454 Permanency may be shown by the injury or its effects. See Cook v. Cook, 607 S.E.2d 459
(W. Va. 2004).
455 Syl. pt. 7, Jordan, 210 S.E.2d at 622-23.
456 King v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239, 243-44 (W. Va. 1976) (citing W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19a).
457 Syl. pt. 2, Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990).
458 West Virginia Fire & Casualty Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 497 (W. Va. 2004).
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consortium includes the loss of: (1) services, (2) society, and (3) sexual rela-
tions.
B. Wrongful Death Damages
Wrongful death damages are created by statute and include the follow-
ing:
The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to,
damages for the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and so-
lace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guid-
ance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent; (B) compensa-
tion for reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the decedent,
and (ii) services, protection, care and assistance provided by the
decedent; (C) expenses for the care, treatment and hospitaliza-
tion of the decedent incident to the injury resulting in death; and
(D) reasonable funeral expenses.460
C. Economic Loss/Bad Bargain/Property Damage
Products liability claims can be brought to recover damage to property
other than the defective product and for damage to the defective product which
results from a "sudden calamitous event." In Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Fur-
niture Co.,461 the court held that "property damage to defective products which
results from a sudden and calamitous event is recoverable under a strict liability
cause of action. Damages which result merely because of a 'bad bargain' are
outside the scope of strict liability." In Roxalana Hills Ltd. v. Masonite
Corp.,462 the court was faced with a case where a contractor sued suppliers and
the manufacturer over siding which was allegedly defective. The plaintiff
sought to pursue a strict liability claim but the court found that actions arising
from "merely ineffective products are actionable only in contract."463 In order
to pursue a strict liability claim, the product must be dangerous and present a
risk of injury. "Recoverable damages do not include the difference in value of
the defective product and its purchase price. . . ."464
459 See Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 830.
460 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(c)(1) (2010).
461 Syl. pt. 3, 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
462 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va.).
463 Id. at 1196.
1 Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d at 861; Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 981 F.2d at 136.
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D. Recovery ofDamages by an Entity
Damages may be recovered under strict liability by an entity or com-
465mercial enterprise. However, strict liability cannot be used to recover lost
profits or consequential economic loss, or indirect loss resulting from the inabil-
ity to make use of the defective products. Rather, recovery for lost profits must
be pursued under a warranty or contract theory cause of action.466
E. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be recovered in a products liability tort action if
the plaintiff proves that his injury was caused by conduct that evidences gross
fraud; malice; oppression; wanton, willful or reckless conduct; or criminal indif-
ference to civil obligations.4 67 Punitive damages may not be recovered in a
breach of warranty action since it is founded on contract.468
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has imposed a variety
of important due process limitations on punitive damages.4 69 Examining these
federal constitutional limitations and their application within West Virginia's
court system is beyond the scope of this Article and will be the subject of sub-
stantial future litigation. Recently the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
recognized that the typical outer limit of the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages is 5 to 1.470
465 Syl. pt. 4, Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d at 854.
466 Kaiser, 981 F.2d at 136 (quoting Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d at 859-60).
467 Syl. pt. 4, Mayer v. Frobe, 22 S.E. 58 (W. Va. 1895); Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307
S.E. 2d 603, 619 ( W. Va. 1983) (quoting O'Brien v. Snodgrass, 16 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1941));
Davis v. Celotex, 420 S.E. 2d 557, 560 (W. Va. 1992).
468 The rule in West Virginia, as in most other jurisdictions, is that "punitive damages are gen-
erally unavailable in pure contract actions." Warden v. Bank of Mingo, 341 S.E.2d 679, 684 (W.
Va. 1986). However, there is a footnote in the 1986 Warden opinion stating that the general rule
"does not apply in exceptional cases where the breach of contract amounts to an independent and
willful tort." Id. at 684 n.7 (citing Goodstein v. Weinberg, 245 S.E.2d 140 (Va. 1978)). As the
Warden case explains, albeit somewhat obliquely, in those "exceptional cases where the breach of
contract amounts to an independent and willful tort," punitive damages are available only when
the plaintiff "elect[s] . . . [to] proceed in tort" rather than "upon contract." Id. at 684 n.7. This was
the situation in the Goodstein case from Virginia cited by the West Virginia court as the source of
its rule. See Goodstein, 245 S.E.2d at 143. Thus, the rule in West Virginia is the same as the rule
in other jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 355 cmt a. Punitive damages
may not be awarded to punish pure breaches of contract. If a breach of contract is so extreme and
wanton that it actually constitutes an independent tort-i.e., the plaintiff asserts and proves a
separate tort claim based on allegations of aggravated contractual breach-then punitive damages
may be available. But where the cause of action is pure contract, there are no punitive damages.
This rule derives from the familiar concept that "[t]he purpose[] of awarding contract damages is
to compensate the injured party," not to punish. Id.
4 See OWEN, supra note 1, at 1270.
470 Syl. pt. 21, Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 821 n.6 (W. Va. 2009).
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VIII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Forms ofEvidence that may be used to Prove Defect
1. Is Expert Testimony Required to Establish Defect?
It is well established under West Virginia law that some issues are so far
outside the ken of an average juror as to require expert testimony.4 7 1 In Watson
v. Inco Alloys International,472 the court states the following: "We believe that
questions involving the design of and appropriate warnings for lift trucks are not
within the common knowledge and experience of a lay juror."473 In fact, Mor-
ningstar states that
[i]n a product liability case, the expert witness is ordinarily the
critical witness. [The expert] serves to set the applicable manu-
facturing, design, labeling and warning standards based on his
experience and expertise in a given product field. Through his
testimony the jury is able to evaluate the complex technical prob-
lems relating to product failure, safety devices, design alterna-
tives, the adequacy of warnings and labels as they relate to eco-
nomic costs. In effect, the expert explains to the jury the
risk/utility standards and gives the jury reasons why the product
does or does not meet such standards, which are essentially stan-
dards of product safeness. 474
In a products case, the issue may arise whether in order to establish a
prima facie case the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony on the issue of
product defect or whether the plaintiff can forego the testimony of an expert
witness and survive a motion for summary judgment by introducing circumstan-
tial evidence that the product was defective. This issue may arise when a plain-
tiff contends that due to the destruction of the product the defect cannot be de-
termined, or when for economic or strategic reasons the plaintiff chooses to fo-
rego disclosing an expert witness on the issue of defect.
471 "It is the general rule that want of professional skill can be proved only by expert wit-
nesses." Howell v. Biggart, 152 S.E. 323, 323 (W. Va. 1930). "It is the general rule that in medi-
cal malpractice cases negligence or want of professional skill can be proved only by expert wit-
nesses." Syl. pt. 1, Farley v. Meadows, 404 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1991) (citing Roberts v. Gale,
139 S.E.2d 807 (1965)).
472 545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001).
473 Id. at 303. The West Virginia Supreme Court has also stated that "[w]e believe that a risk-
utility analysis does have a place in a tort product liability case by setting the general contours of
relevant expert testimony concerning the defectiveness of the product." Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d
at 687 (citing FRANKLiN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS §
7-2(A)(2) at 32-34 (3d ed. 1994)).
474 253 S.E.2d at 682.
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There is no presumption that a plaintiff is entitled to recover simply be-
cause an accident occurred involving a product, 475 because an accident, by it-
476
self, is not evidence of a defect or causation.
In Brady v. Deals on Wheels, Inc., 477 the court held that the plaintiff had
the burden to establish not only the existence of a defect, but also a burden "to
link the defect to the accident by demonstrating that the defect was the prox-
imate cause of the accident.A78 Two years later in Beatty v. Ford Motor Com-
pany,479 the court held that post-crash discovery of a fractured steering compo-
nent was insufficient to create an inference of a product defect. In 2003, in
Mrotek v. Coal River Canoe Livery,480 the court affirmed summary judgment for
the defendant because the plaintiffs self-serving testimony combined with that
of an eyewitness was insufficient to meet the burden of proof to establish defect
allegations in a product liability case where the product evidence had been dis-
carded.48 1
These three West Virginia cases help define logical boundaries regard-
ing the evidence required to prove a defect in a product liability case. In Brady
the court addressed proximate cause and the need to proximately link the al-
leged defect to the accident. In Beatty, the court affirmed that the law does not
automatically presume a design or manufacturing defect when there is an acci-
dent. In Mrotek, the court combined elements of Brady and Beatty and, in addi-
tion, addressed the inherent weakness of bare testimonial evidence, especially in
light of the absence of the product at issue in that case. Mrotek clearly sets forth
the standard that a plaintiff needs more than her self-serving testimony, even
when combined with that of an eyewitness, to withstand a motion for summary
judgment in a product liability case.
In Roney v. Gencorp,482 Judge Chambers addressed the issue of whether
a plaintiff was required to rely on the testimony of an expert witness to show
that based upon the state-of-the-art scientific knowledge, a reasonable supplier
of vinyl chloride monomer would foresee a likely risk of harm to an end user of
that chemical. Judge Chambers held the following:
Parsing evidence of state-of-the-art scientific knowledge, would
require interpretation of scientific publications and data then
475 See Crane & Equip. Rental Co. v. Park Corporation, 350 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1986).
476 See Walton v. Given, 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (W. Va. 1975) (injury or damages alone are
insufficient to warrant recovery).
477 542 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 2000).
478 Id. at 464.
479 574 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 2002).
480 590 S.E.2d. 683 (W. Va. 2003).
481 See also Wilkinson, 575 S.E.2d at 341 (court required expert testimony in a pharmaceutical
warnings case).
482 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Roney v. Gencorp, Civ. Action No. 3:05-0788 (Sept. 18,
2009).
498 [Vol. 1 13
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available to that supplier. Just as a jury is ill equipped to deter-
mine, on its own, whether the conduct of a physician met pro-
fessional standards in the industry, it is ill equipped to analyze
and compare scientific literature and data concerning the ha-
zards of vinyl chloride monomer. The jury, therefore, cannot
resolve factual questions surrounding the duty to inspect with-
out the assistance of a qualified expert.483
It is important to note that while West Virginia has adopted Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 84 regarding scientific testimony, it has not
adopted Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichaess regarding technical testimony.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has specifically held that the ga-
tekeeping standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert,
applies to the admission of an engineer's testimony only where the testimony
deals with scientific knowledge.4 86 Of course, many experts in products liability
matters, often depending on the product, will identify their testimony as scientif-
ic, or derived from the "scientific method." In that case a Daubert/Wilt analysis
is required.487
Assuming the testimony is not "scientific," the trial court will apply a
two-part inquiry under Watson. First, the court will ask whether the proposed
expert meets the minimal educational or experiential qualifications in a field that
is relevant to the subject under investigation, and whether the testimony assists
the trier of fact. Second, the court will determine whether the expert's area of
expertise covers the particular opinion as to which the expert seeks to testify.488
2. Circumstantial Evidence may be used to Show Defect under
Certain Conditions
Although expert testimony will be generally required in a products case,
in limited factual situations, a plaintiff may proceed on circumstantial evi-
dence.4 89 This theory is sometimes referred to as the "malfunction" theory.
Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to make a prima fa-
cie case in a strict liability action, even though the precise na-
ture of the defect cannot be identified, so long as the evidence
483 Id.
484 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
485 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
486 See Watson v. Inco Alloys, International, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001).
487 See Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993); Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171
(W. Va. 1995).
488 Syl. pt. 4, Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 294.
489 See Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E. 2d 189 (W. Va. 1991).
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shows that a malfunction in the product occurred that would not
ordinarily happen in the absence of a defect. Moreover, the
plaintiff must show there was neither abnormal use of the prod-
uct nor a reasonable secondary cause for the malfunction.490
An Anderson-type case has three specific elements. First, the plaintiffs
must show that the malfunction in the product occurred that would not ordinari-
ly happen in the absence of a defect. Second, the plaintiffs must show that no
abnormal use of the product occurred. Third, the plaintiffs must rule out rea-
sonable secondary causes for the malfunction.4 91
The facts of Anderson are instructive. In Anderson, the vehicle was a
"brand new" Chrysler less than four months old with less than 2500 miles on
it.4 92 The Anderson vehicle was a "lemon" and had been serviced six to eight
times during that brief four month period for electrical and wiring defects (in-
cluding replacing the wiring harness in the dashboard-exactly where the fire
was observed to start).493 On the day the vehicle was picked up from the shop
for repair for the same electrical defects, Ms. Anderson immediately noticed that
the defects had not been fixed.4 94 Within hours of picking the vehicle up from
the shop, Ms. Anderson noticed a burning odor, saw smoke from the dashboard,
and flames quickly followed.4 95 The fire began while Ms. Anderson was in the
car, with the engine running and with Ms. Anderson actually driving the car.496
There was no question as to when, where, and why the fire started.497
B. Contribution/Indemnity
1. Contribution/Indemnity
The concepts of contribution and indemnity are common in product liti-
gation. Each doctrine arises from equitable considerations. The right to contri-
bution arises when persons having a common obligation, either in contract or
tort, are sued on that obligation and one party is forced to pay more than his pro
tanto share of the obligation. One of the essential differences between indemni-
ty and contribution is that contribution does not permit a full recovery of all
490 Syl. pt. 3, id.
491 Id
492 Id. at 194.
493 Id at 191.
494 id
495 Anderson, 403 S.E.2d at 191.
496 Id
497 Id.; see also Adkins v. K-Mart Corp., 511 S.E.2d 840 (W. Va.1998) (per curiam); Bennett v.
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damages paid by the party seeking contribution. Recovery can only be obtained
for the excess that such party has paid over his own share.
Indemnity arises when the person seeking to assert implied indemnity-
the indemnitee-has been required to pay damages caused by a third-party-the
indemnitor. In the typical case, the indemnitee is made liable to the injured par-
ty because of some positive duty created by statute or the common law, but the
actual cause of the injury was the act of the indemnitor.498 Although all of the
entities in the chain of distribution may be liable for damages under a strict lia-
bility or warranty theory, a seller who has not contributed to the defect in a
product may have an implied indemnity claim against the party that actually
created the defect.499 In order to maintain an implied indemnity claim, the party
must be completely fault-free.so When and how to assert a claim for indemnity
or contribution must be handled carefully, and with an emphasis on early notice
and assertion of such rights. In Haynes v. City of Nitro,5 0 the West Virginia
Supreme Court extended a right of contribution to a tortfeasor to bring in as a
third-party defendant a fellow joint tortfeasor to share by way of contribution on
the verdict recovered by the plaintiff.502
With respect to contribution, the court has held that such right will be
waived if not asserted in the underlying action.
A defendant may not pursue a separate cause of action against a
joint tortfeasor for contribution after judgment has been ren-
dered in the underlying case, when that joint tortfeasor was not
a party in the underlying case and the defendant did not file a
third-party claim pursuant to Rule 14(a) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure.so3
Further,
[tihe inchoate right of contribution recognized by this state can
only be asserted by means of third-party impleader in an action
brought by the injured party against a tortfeasor. Consequently,
a tortfeasor who negotiates and consummates a settlement with
an injured party on behalf of itself before any lawsuit is filed
498 Syl. pt. 2, Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296, 296 (W. Va. 1980); Syl.
pt. 1, Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prod., Inc., 288 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1982).
499 Syl. pt. 1, Hill, 268 S.E.2d at 296.
So See Syl. pt. 4, Harvest Capitol v. W. Va. Dep't of Energy, 560 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 2002) (if
a seller contributes in some way to the product's defect, the seller and manufacturer are jointly
responsible for the damages caused by the product, and seller has no right to seek implied indem-
nity).
501 240 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1977).
502 Id. at 550.
503 Syl. pt. 5, Howell v. Luckey, 518 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1999).
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cannot subsequently bring an action seeking contribution from a
tortfeasor who was not apprised of and not a party to the settle-
ment negotiations and agreement.504
There will also be situations in product litigation where there is contrac-
tual indemnity. If a party wants to preserve its contractual rights for indemnity,
it should put that company on "reasonable notice" of the pending suit and advise
them of their right and opportunity to step in, indemnify, and defend, or other-
wise be bound by any judgment rendered in the suit. As an additional step, the
indemnitee will also want to consider bringing the indemnitor into the case ab-
sent an express agreement that that company will not refuse its contractual in-
demnity obligations in this case, should a verdict be rendered against the indem-
nitee. In addition, the indemnitor will need to be put on notice of any settlement
negotiations between the plaintiff and indemnitee.505  Although Vankirk ad-
dresses contractual indemnity (rather than an inchoate right to contribution), it
was decided prior to Howell v. Luckey and CAMC v. Parke-Davis, when the
jurisprudential trend began to move toward requiring all the parties who contri-
buted to the plaintiffs injuries to be brought together in a single cause of action.
Because the concepts of contribution or indemnity are inchoate rights,
there may be a natural hesitation to assert the same prior to such rights materia-
lizing. However, in light of the Howell decision, the party seeking contribution
or indemnity should promptly assert that right by impleading the indemnitor or
joint tortfeasor. Otherwise, and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
such contribution or indemnity rights may be waived if they are not asserted in
the underlying litigation.
2. Implied Indemnity Claims Cannot be Involuntarily Extin-
guished
A party in a civil action who has made a good faith settlement with the
plaintiff prior to a judicial determination of liability is relieved from any liability
for contribution.50 6 A defendant in a civil action has a right in advance of judg-
ment to join a joint tortfeasor based on a cause of action for contribution. This
is termed an "inchoate right to contribution" in order to distinguish it from the
statutory right of contribution after a joint judgment conferred by West Virginia
Code section 55-7-13 (1923).507
504 Syl. pt. 6, Charleston Area Med. Ctr. v. Parke-Davis, 614 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 2005).
505 Syl. pt. 6, Vankirk v. Green Constr. Co., 466 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1995) ("Where an indem-
nitor is given reasonable notice by the indemnitee of a claim that is covered by the indemnity
agreement and is afforded an opportunity to defend the claim and fails to do so, the indemnitor is
then bound by the judgment against the indemnitee if it was rendered without collusion on the part
of the indemnitee.").
506 Syl. pt. 6, Bd. of Educ. of McDowell Cnty. v. Zando, 390 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 1990).
507 Syl. pt. 2, id.
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Additionally, although a good faith settlement extinguishes the contri-
bution claims of a co-defendant, in the product liability context implied indem-
nity claims cannot be extinguished by a good faith settlement.
In a multiparty product liability lawsuit, a good faith settlement
between the plaintiff(s) and the manufacturing defendant who is
responsible for the defective product will not extinguish the
right of a non-settling defendant to seek implied indemnifica-
tion when the liability of the non-settling defendant is predi-
cated not on its own independent fault or negligence, but on a
theory of strict liability.sos
As a result of the Dunn decision, a manufacturer will often obtain a
release of innocent sellers or suppliers in the chain of distribution.
C. Joint and Several Liability
Traditionally, West Virginia was a pure joint and several liability juris-
diction, with no statutory dilution of the doctrine. As stated by the Supreme
Court of Appeals: "This jurisdiction is committed to the concept of joint and
several liability among joint tortfeasors. A plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of
those responsible for his injuries and collect his damages from whomever is able
to pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault."5 09
However, in 2005 the Legislature modified the common law rule and
enacted West Virginia Code section 55-7-24(a)(2), which stated that if a party
was found by the jury to be "thirty percent or less at fault, then that defendant's
liability shall be several and not joint and he or she shall be liable only for the
damages attributable to him or her, except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion."510 Significantly, one of the statutory exceptions also enacted at that time
set forth in subsection (b)(4) was "[a]ny party strictly liable for the manufacturer
and sale of a defective product.""
508 Syl. pt. 6, Dunn v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1995). Although
this is the rule in products cases (because of the possibility that a party will have liability imposed
upon it solely for being in the chain of distribution even if it bears no fault), this will not neces-
sarily apply outside of the chain of distribution context. In Hager v. Marshall, the West Virginia
Supreme Court stated "[i]n non-product liability multi-party civil actions, a good faith settlement
between a plaintiff and a defendant will extinguish the right of a non-settling defendant to seek
implied indemnity unless such non-settling defendant is without fault. . . ." Syl. pt. 7, 505 S.E.2d
640 (W. Va. 1998). This quote suggests that Dunn is limited to its facts, and the chain of distribu-
tion in products cases. In Woodrum v. Johnson, 599 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 2001), the court sug-
gested (a la Dunn) that where a principal is solely liable for an agent who settles, there may be a
right of indemnity despite the settlement.
5 Syl. pt. 13, Strahin v. Cleavenger, 603 S.E.2d 197, 202 (W. Va. 2004).
510 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-24(a)(2) (2010).
511 Id. § 55-7-24(b)(4).
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Thus, under the current statutory scheme, the common law rule of joint
and several liability applies to a manufacturer whose product is found to be de-
fective pursuant to a strict liability theory and that manufacturer will be jointly
and severally liable for all of the plaintiffs damages even if its fault is found to
be only one percent. However, if the plaintiff is proceeding pursuant to a negli-
gence or fraud/misrepresentation theory, then the manufacturer will only be
jointly and severally liable if its fault is found to be greater than thirty percent.5 12
D. Product Liability Issues Arising in Vehicle Litigation
1. Crashworthiness
One of the more complicated concepts in products liability litigation is
the doctrine of crashworthiness.1 Sometimes referred to as "second automo-
tive collision" cases, they are more accurately described as "enhanced injury"
cases. The theory against the manufacturer in a crashworthiness case is that the
plaintiff suffered an additional or enhanced injury as a result of a defect in the
product.5 1 4 Under this theory of liability, a manufacturer must design its product
to minimize foreseeable harm to the product's user that may occur in an acci-
dent.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the "crashwor-
thiness doctrine" in Blankenship v. General Motors Corp.5 16 The court revisited
the doctrine in Johnson," and then again in Tracy.5t8 The court has defined a
"crashworthiness" case as one "in which there are two collisions."s 9 In the first
phase of the accident, the plaintiffs automobile collides with another automo-
bile or object. While this first collision is typically the injury producing event,
under a crashworthiness theory, there is a second phase, or second collision, in
which the occupants are injured as a result of the occupant's interaction with a
defective condition in some part of the automobile. If the vehicle is defectively
designed, the manufacturer will be liable for the plaintiffs injuries in the second
512 Id. § 55-7-24.
513 There have been six West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases addressing crashwor-
thiness. See Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 680 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 2009); Estep, 672 S.E.2d at 345;
Tracy, 524 S.E.2d at 879; Louk v. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 479 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1996); Johnson v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d
781 (W. Va. 1991). See generally OWEN, supra note 1, at 1124.
514 See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.
51s Id.
516 406 S.E.2d 781, 785-86 (W. Va. 1991).
s1 438 S.E.2d 28, 32 (W. Va. 1993).
518 524 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1999).
519 Id. at 892.
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collision only if the defective design of the automobile caused or exacerbated
the plaintiffs injury.520
In defining West Virginia crashworthiness law, and quoting Blanken-
ship, the Johnson court explained that "to recover on a theory of crashworthi-
ness against the manufacturer of a motor vehicle, it is necessary only to show
that a defect in the vehicle's design was a factor in causing some aspect of the
plaintiff s harm."52 1
The plaintiff always carries the burden of proving the threshold ques-
tions of defect and causation, and crashworthiness claims are no different. If the
burden were not placed on the plaintiff, it would subject a manufacturer to "ab-
solute liability" in violation of Morningstar and Blankenship. Rather, in a
crashworthiness case, a plaintiff must prove that "a defect was a factor in caus-
ing some aspect of plaintiffs harm."5 2 2 That threshold question of establishing
a defect and causation is fundamental to a plaintiff's right to recover.
However, in a rare case there may be a situation where the defendant
seeks to apportion damages, i.e., dividing the enhanced injuries from the injuries
that would have naturally flowed from the crash itself. Accordingly, West Vir-
ginia crashworthiness case law also provides for apportionment, but when ap-
portionment is sought by the defendant, the burden of proving apportionment
(but not defect) shifts. In Johnson, the court stated that "[o]nce the plaintiff has
made this prima facie showing, the manufacturer can then limit its liability if it
can show that the plaintiffs injuries are capable of apportionment between the
first and second collisions; therefore, the burden is upon the manufacturer to
make the allocation."5 23
Johnson was a personal injury case where the jury was requested to and
did apportion the enhanced injuries received from the defective seatbelt from the
injuries received in the car accident. The case was complicated by the applica-
tion of West Virginia law regarding joint and several liability and setoffs from
prior settlements. The court held that
[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to recover damages on a theory of
crashworthiness against the manufacturer of a motor vehicle,
and the manufacturer requests that the jury apportion the dam-
520 An interesting point from Blankenship, is syl. pt. 3, stating "[i]n the litigation of vehicle
crashworthiness cases under theories of product liability, whenever there is a split of authority in
other jurisdictions on an issue about which this court has not yet spoken, the trial court should
presume that we would adopt the rule most favorable to the plaintiff." 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va.
1991). This language, from the decision authored by former Justice Neely, suggested that West
Virginia would abdicate its crashworthiness jurisprudence to even a single minority decision from
another jurisdiction. However, as is clear from the decisions post-Blankenship, the Supreme Court
of Appeals continues to address crashworthiness issues on the merits and has not abdicated its
authority or suggestions in Blankenship.
521 Syl. pt. 1, Johnson, 438 S.E.2d at 30.
522 Syl. pt. 2, Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 781.
523 Syl. pt. 1, Johnson, 438 S.E.2d at 30.
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ages between the first and second collisions, and the jury does
so, the prior settlements between the plaintiff and the other de-
fendants will not be setoff from the jury verdict.524
When apportionment is not sought, it follows that prior settlements be-
tween the plaintiff and the other defendants will be setoff from the jury verdict.
This is consistent with West Virginia law regarding joint and several liability.
As the court stated in Johnson, "we already have the jury apportion damages
among joint tortfeasors in comparative negligence." 52 5
Johnson has been modified by Tracy, 5 2 6 in the context of crashworthi-
ness cases involving wrongful death. While the court in Johnson stated that it
was the province of the jury, not the court, to determine whether damages were
capable of apportionment in crashworthiness cases,527 Tracy modifies this rule
when the accident results in death. In Tracy, the Court held that where the in-
jury in a crashworthiness case was indivisible, i.e., death, a jury instruction al-
lowing the jury to apportion injuries was reversible error.52 8 The Tracy court
further found reversible error in a jury instruction that required the plaintiffs
estate to establish that the automobile's design defect was "the" rather than "a"
proximate cause of death.
In Tracy, the estate of a passenger killed in an automobile collision sued
the manufacturer claiming that the passenger's death resulted from a defective
seat belt restraint system. The accident in Tracy occurred when the driver, trav-
eling on a rain-slickened road, veered off the road and onto the berm, over-
corrected the steering wheel in attempting to steer back onto the road and lost
control of the vehicle resulting in a fatal collision with another vehicle. The
plaintiff passenger had been wearing a lap and shoulder belt at the time of the
accident and claimed that the restraint system was defective. On appeal from a
jury verdict in favor of the manufacturer, the plaintiff claimed that the jury in-
structions erroneously allowed the jury to apportion injuries even though the
injury-death-was indivisible.
Quoting the "second collision" rule, the court in Tracy stated that
under the crashworthiness doctrine, [a]ny design defect not
causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer to lia-
bility for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be lia-
ble for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defec-
tive design over and above the damage or injury that probably
524 Syl. pt. 2, id.
525 Id. at 34.
526 524 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1999).
527 Id. at 887 n.4.
528 Id. at 897.
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would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent
the defective design.529
Discussing the split of authority on the burden of proof in establishing
the extent of the injury caused by the defect, the court noted that it had earlier
adopted the "more liberal rule" set forth in Fox v. Ford Motor Co. 530 and its
progeny that puts the burden on a defendant manufacturer to show that the
plaintiffs injuries are capable of apportionment between the first and second
collisions and thereby limit its liability.5 31
Applying the law of concurrent negligence to crashworthiness cases, the
court in Tracy quoted the holding in Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, 532 that
'[i]f the manufacturer's negligence is found to be a substantial
factor in causing an indivisible injury such as . .. death, . . . then
absent a reasonable basis to determine which wrongdoer actual-
ly caused the harm, the defendants should be treated as joint and
several tortfeasors."' The court in Tracy extended prior law,
stating that "[w]ith due recognition for our prior acceptance of
concurrent negligence concepts and our adoption of the crash-
worthiness doctrine, we take our jurisprudence in this field one
step further by today holding that a defendant manufacturer
seeking to apportion liability for the indivisible injury of death
in a wrongful death crashworthiness cause of action must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defective product
was not a factor in causing the decedent's death. Absent such a
showing, the defendant manufacturer is jointly and severally li-
able for all of the harm.
Limiting its holding to crashworthiness cases involving fatal injuries,
the Tracy court held that the question of whether or not the harm to the plaintiff
is capable of apportionment among two or more causes is a question of law for
the judge and not the jury to decide.534 The court concluded that
[i]n a wrongful death crashworthiness cause of action, the jury
is charged with determining whether the vehicle's design was
defective. The ultimate issue of whether the resultant death can
529 Id. at 892.
530 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
s3 Tracy, 524 S.E.2d at 893 (citing Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 781
(W. Va. 1991)).
532 669 F.2d 1199, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982).
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be apportioned among the multiple collisions is a question of
law to be decided by the trial judge. If the trial judge concludes
that the fatal injury can be apportioned, the jury then may de-
termine the apportionment of the defendants' liability and the
consequent damages for which they are responsible.
From a practitioner's standpoint, the complexity of first-second colli-
sion apportionment law in West Virginia poses the possibility for jury confusion
and distraction from the issue of whether the product is defective in the first
place. Accordingly, at trial many cases focus purely on whether there is a defect
and proximate cause, and the manufacturer typically does not seek apportion-
ment.
While the concepts of apportionment of injury and apportionment
among tortfeasors are distinct, they are often confused. The adoption of crash-
worthiness in West Virginia has not altered the principles of joint and several
liability, except as to the burden shift on proving injury apportionment if, and
only if, the manufacturer seeks apportionment of the injury.
Crashworthiness cases have also not altered the concept of comparative
negligence. In West Virginia, "questions of negligence and [comparative] neg-
ligence are for the jury when the evidence is conflicting or when the facts,
though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclu-
sions from them."5 36 Louk involved a crashworthiness case that also included
issues of comparative negligence and negligent roadway design. The court held
that evidence of comparative negligence and the evidence as to the cause of the
collision was relevant.
Even though the fact is undisputed that Deborah Louk pulled
out of the Wal-Mart parking lot into the path of an oncoming
vehicle, we believe that jurors reasonably might reach differing
conclusions as to whether the negligence of Wal-Mart, Gray
Engineering, and the DOH, if any, was a greater contributing
cause to the collision than was the negligence of Ms. Louk, if
any. In this regard, they may consider a variety of factors shown
by the evidence bearing on the cause or causes of the colli-
sion."'
The most on-point opinion from any court in West Virginia addressing
the admissibility of comparative fault evidence in a crashworthiness case is Cir-
cuit Court Judge Hoke's opinion in Waller, discussed above in Part
53 Id
536 Syl. pt. 10, Louk v. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 479 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1996) (citing Syl. pt. 3,
Davis v. Sargent, 78 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1953)).
537 Louk, 479 S.E.2d at 926-27.
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VI(E)(1)(3). 8 In Waller, the decedent was driving while intoxicated from a
large dose of prescription medication and was involved in an accident.539 The
plaintiff sued arguing that the vehicle was uncrashworthy due to improper fire
proofing and defects in the fuel system. 54 0 Judge Hoke addressed the precise
issue of what evidence of the plaintiffs comparative fault could be admitted in a
crashworthiness case and found that evidence of the plaintiffs drug use was
directly relevant and admissible to the comparative fault determination.5 4 1
2. Seatbelt Statute
a. Automobiles
Many states (through court decisions or legislation) have made public
policy decisions limiting the introduction of the plaintiffs failure to wear seat-
belts in motor vehicle accidents. Specifically in West Virginia, the mandatory
use law limits seatbelt non-use evidence stating that "[a] violation of this section
is not admissible as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence or com-
parative negligence in any civil action or proceeding for damages, and shall not
be admissible in mitigation of damages .... In order to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule (and a five percent reduction in damages), the plaintiff must stipu-
late to the reduction in damages and may not offer evidence of seatbelt use. The
exclusionary rule has been held to apply in a crashworthiness case where the
543
design of the airbag system in the vehicle is the sole issue in the case.
One interesting issue that has yet to come before the court is whether
the seatbelt statute will apply when the plaintiff alleges that the seatbelt itself is
defective. In other words, can the plaintiff have her cake and eat it too, by alleg-
ing that the seatbelt is defective and simultaneously use the seatbelt statute to
block evidence that the seatbelt was not worn? Logically, it would seem unlike-
ly that the court would rule that a plaintiff could use the statute in this manner.
First, by bringing a claim alleging a defective seat belt, the plaintiff would
waive any objection to seatbelt-use evidence and open the door to such evi-
dence. Second, application of the seatbelt statute in this context would violate
Morningstar,5" which permits the manufacturer to defend based upon the plain-
tiff's misuse of the product and expressly disclaims that the manufacturer is an
insurer or guarantor of its product. Third, application of the seatbelt statute to
538 Waller v. Ford Motor Co., 2008 WL 8129681 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2008).
539 Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 2-3.
541 Id. at 7.
542 W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-49(d) (2010).
543 See Estep v. v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln Mercury Inc., 672 S.E.2d 345, 345 (W. Va. 2008).
54 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979)
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bar evidence that the plaintiff was not wearing the seatbelt would arguably vi-
olate both the state and federal constitutions.
The decision in Bishop v. Takata Corp.545 is instructive. In that case,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma seatbelt statute did not
bar evidence of the use or nonuse of seatbelts where the plaintiff was bringing a
seatbelt defect claim. 54 6 In a subsequent decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reaffirmed its earlier ruling, and also held that it would be improper to allow the
plaintiff to present her seat-belt-use evidence while barring the manufacturer's
evidence: "However, [the plaintiff] cannot selectively eliminate evidence per-
taining to certain components of the seat's occupant restraint system such as the
lap belt, while offering evidence as to other elements, such as the shoulder belt,
driver's seat, and seat bracket."547 To hold otherwise would be akin to imposing
absolute liability for an allegedly defective seatbelt, regardless of whether the
injured plaintiff was properly using the seatbelt at the time of the accident.
b. Non-Automobiles
Another interesting issue arises in litigation involving non-automotive
vehicles that have seatbelts, including off-road vehicles, boats, etc. In these
cases the seat belt statute should not apply, and thus the defendant should be
able to introduce evidence of failure to wear a seatbelt. As Justice Benjamin's
dissent in Estep notes, Rule 402 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence would
have permitted introduction of the plaintiffs failure to wear a seatbelt in the
absence of West Virginia Code section 17C-15-49(d). 548 The code section ap-
plies only to "passenger vehicles," defined as
a motor vehicle which is designed for transporting ten passen-
gers or less, including the driver, except that such term does not
include a motorcycle, a trailer, or any motor vehicle which is
not required on the date of the enactment of this section under a
federal motor vehicle safety standard to be equipped with a belt
system.54 9
Because these non-automobiles are not "motor vehicles" subject to
FMVSS,550 the seat belt statute should be inapplicable. To date there are no
rulings from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that address this is-
sue.
545 12 P.3d 459 (Okla. 2000).
546 Id. at 466.
547 Clark v. Mazda Motor Corp., 68 P.3d 207, 209 (Okla. 2003).
548 Estep, 672 S.E.2d at 358 (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
549 W. VA. CODE § 17-C- 15-49(a) (2010).
550 See 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (2006) (defining motor vehicle as "a vehicle driven or drawn by
mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways").
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E. Spoliation ofEvidence
There is no substitute for examining physical evidence in a product lia-
bility action. "The expert witness is ordinarily the critical witness," but that
expert needs to be able to inspect the relevant evidence to evaluate the complex
technical problems relating to the product. 5'" Typically, the product itself is the
best witness about conditions at the time of the accident. Often physical forces
such as stress, shear, or friction leave telltale signs on physical objects that can
be understood by people who have the appropriate education and training.
Where the allegedly defective product is destroyed before a party and its experts
have an opportunity to inspect the product, the party may suffer prejudice. 5 2
Product liability cases may be dismissed on summary judgment when evidence
has not been preserved."5
"It is a fundamental principal of law that a party who reasonably antic-
ipates litigation has an affirmative duty to preserve relevant evidence." 554 The
authority to impose sanctions for the destruction of relevant evidence is recog-
nized under product liability law.555  Courts have the inherent power to issue
sanctions in order to "manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases."55 6 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has addressed spoliation of evidence and has authorized the imposition of
sanctions.557 To be certain, a vast panoply of sanctions has been ratified by nu-
merous courts throughout the country. West Virginia's courts have recognized
the sanctioning of "an offending party by an outright dismissal of claims, the
exclusion of countervailing evidence, or a negative inference jury instruction on
spoliation."55 8
5s1 See Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979).
552 "[T]he precise condition [of the evidence] immediately after an accident may be far more
instructive, and persuasive to a jury than oral or photographic descriptions of them." Nally v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1989). See also Dillon v. Nissan Motor
Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993).
5s3 See Vedder v. Zakaib, 618 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 2005).
554 Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W. Va. 1999) (citing Baliotis v. McNeal, 870 F.
Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa. 1994)).
5 Baliotis, 870 F. Supp. at 1289.
556 Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). The Baliotis court also
stated that "sanctions for loss of evidence is 'part of a district court's inherent powers ... to make
discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a 'fair and orderly trial."' Id. (quot-
ing Uniguard Sec. Ins Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992)).
ss7 See Syl. pt. 2, Tracy, 524 S.E.2d at 879. See also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (2003)
(recognizing an independent cause of action for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence).
558 Tracy, 524 S.E.2d at 887.
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F. Actions Against Firearm & Ammunition Manufacturer
The Legislature has limited suits against firearm manufacturers brought
in the name of cities or municipalities:
The authority to bring suit and the right to recover against any
firearms or ammunition manufacturer, seller, trade association
or dealer of firearms by or on behalf of any county or munici-
pality in this state for damages, abatement or injunctive relief
resulting from or relating to the design, manufacture, marketing,
or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public is reserved ex-
clusively to the state: Provided, That nothing contained in this
article may prohibit a county or municipality from bringing an
action for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or am-
munition purchased by the county or municipality.55 9
G. Drug and Medical Device Suits Against Hospitals, Physicians, and
Pharmacies
Drug and medical device cases are one of the most critical pieces of the
products liability landscape in West Virginia. For the most part, we have ad-
dressed issues pertinent to these cases throughout the article (examples include
warnings causation, "fraud on the FDA," Restatement comment k (inherently
dangerous products), learned intermediary, preemption, etc.). However, these
cases are often treated differently than other products cases and require very
specialized knowledge. Although cursory, we do want to identify some issues
that either apply exclusively or more frequently in drug and medical device cas-
es.
1. General and Specific Causation
In typical products litigation the causation inquiry is treated as a single
issue: Was the alleged defect a proximate cause of this plaintiffs injury? This
unified analysis makes sense in classic products litigation. For example, it is
obvious that a chain saw could injure a person, the issue is whether the particu-
lar chain saw is defective and whether that defect proximately caused the plain-
tiff's injuries in that case (or whether a different warning would have prevented
the injury, etc.).
However, in pharmaceutical (and toxic tort) litigation there often is a
real issue as to whether the product is capable of causing the alleged injury
(general causation) and whether it did, in fact, cause the injuries to this particu-
s59 See W. VA. CODE § 55-18-2 (2010).
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lar plaintiff (specific causation). 56 0  Thus, for example, in a failure-to-warn
pharmaceutical case the plaintiff "must show three things: (1) the drug is capa-
ble of causing the injury [general causation], (2) the drug did in fact cause the
injury [specific causation], and (3) a different warning would have avoided the
injury [proximate causation]." 56 ' Typically, all of these causation inquiries will
focus on scientific testimony.5 62
2. Is the Implantation a Sale?
In the drug and medical device context, an issue that may arise is
whether a particular product was "sold" or "distributed" by the hospital or phy-
sician, or rather was provided as an incident to the services rendered to the pa-
tient. For example, in Foster v. Memorial Hospital Ass 'n,5 63 the court found that
a hospital's supplying blood to a patient was a not a "sale" but rather the per-
formance of a service rendered to the patient. The Foster court described the
nature of the contractual relationship between a doctor and a patient stating:
[s]uch a contract is clearly one for services, and, just as clearly,
it is not divisible. Concepts of purchase and sale cannot sepa-
rately be attached to the healing materials-such as medicines,
drugs, or indeed, blood-supplied by the physician for a price
as part of medical services it offers. That the property or title to
certain items of medical material may be transferred, so to
speak, from the physician to the patient during the course of
medical treatment does not serve to make each such transaction
a sale.
In Lester, then-Circuit Court Judge Irene Berger reached a similar con-
clusion and found that the insertion of a cervical spine locking plate during a
medical procedure "did not constitute a 'sale' as contemplated by West Virginia
products liability law, but was incidental to the provision of medical services to
a patient." As a result, Judge Berger dismissed the products liability claims
560 "General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condi-
tion in the general population, while specific causation is whether a substance caused a particular
individual's injury." Meade v. Parsley, 2010 WL 4909435 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (Copenhaver, J.)
(quoting In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F.Supp 2d. 398, 402 (S.D.N.Y 2005)).
561 Id. at *14; see also Bourne v. E. I DuPont de Nemours & Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 482, 485
(S.D. W. Va. 2002).
562 Meade, 2010 WL 4909435, at *13-27 (general causation inquiry will typically focus on a
review of the scientific and medical literature that exposure to a substance can cause a particular
disease).
563 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975).
5 Id. at 919 (quoting Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 1954)).
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against the hospital. 6 5 Judge Reed reached an identical conclusion finding that
St. Josephs Hospital was not a merchant, seller, or vendor of a guidewire at is-
sue and therefore claims for products liability and breach of warranty could not
be maintained against the hospital.s66
However, in the breast implant litigation, Kanawha County Circuit
Court Judge King found that hospitals and doctors could be sued under products
liability theories for defective breast implants under the theory that the patient
was in fact, purchasing the implants and not the surgery to implant them.56 7
Judge King based his ruling on his analysis of "the essence of the transaction,"
harkening back to the "incident to the services" concept from Foster. Judge
King's order was appealed as a certified question to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, which declined to docket the appeal.
The Supreme Court of Appeals again had the opportunity to address this
issue in Blankenship v. Ethicon,56 8 which involved a medical device case
brought against several hospitals and the manufacturer alleging that patients
incurred surgical infections as a result of the implantation of allegedly contami-
nated sutures. 56 9 However, the court chose not to address products liability is-
sues and instead decided the appeal on the issue of whether the plaintiff was
required to comply with the MPLA in regard to the suit against the hospitals.
Despite this second opportunity to address Judge King's analysis, the majority
left it untouched. Justice Starcher writing separately in a concurrence/dissent
considered this issue on the merits and would have permitted these entities to be
sued in a products liability suit.570
3. Off-Label Use Issues
An off-label claim involves the allegation that a manufacturer received
FDA approval for one use of the product, yet is marketing the product for
another use not specified in the approved label, i.e., an off-label use. At this
time, we are not aware of any published opinions from West Virginia courts
dealing with the merits of off-label use issues. Cases that tangentially cite off-
565 See Order, Lester v. Appalachian Reg. Healthcare, Inc., Cir. Ct. of Kanawha County, Civil
Action No. 01-C-534 (Jan. 16, 2003, Berger, J.).
566 See Order Regarding St. Joseph Hosp. Motion for Partial Sununary Judgment and Motion to
Compel, Chancellor v. Shannon, Cir. Ct. of Wood County, Civil Action No. 93-C- 1103 (July 31,
1995, Reed, J.).
567 See Order Regarding In re: Implants I, Cir. Ct. of Kanawha County, Civil Action No. 93-C-
9595 (Dec. 6, 1994, King, J.).
568 656 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 2007).
569 Id Judge King was the trial judge in Blankenship, and used the same "essence of the trans-
action" analysis, but reached a different result.
570 See id. at 461-64 (Starcher, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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label issues include Justice Starcher's concurrence in Karl and Chief Judge Ha-
den's preemption ruling in McCallister.s1
4. Pharmacies
By statute "the manufacturer," and not a dispensing pharmacist, is "re-
sponsible" for drugs "sold in or dispensed unchanged from the original retail
package of the manufacturer."5 7 2 This statute has been held to immunize phar-
macies from suits relating to the product itself.13
5. FDA Warning Letters
If the FDA disagrees with the contents of a drug's label it has the au-
thority to issue an informal warning letter to the manufacturer to that effect. An
issue had arisen as to whether an informal warning letter constituted an adminis-
trative finding by the FDA that the drug's label was inaccurate that was entitled
to preclusive effect. In a suit brought by the State Attorney General pursuant to
the WVCCPA regarding the labeling of Risperdal and Duragesic, the Circuit
Court of Brooke County ruled that the FDA's informal warning letters were
preclusive, and therefore, barred the manufacturer from contending that the
drugs' labels were accurate. In State ex rel. McGraw v. Johnson & Johnson,5 74
the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the FDA's decision to send such a letter
did not constitute a final determination by the Agency that the label was false;
therefore, the warning letter could not be used as an administrative finding en-
titled to preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation.57 5
6. Counterfeit Products
No court in West Virginia has recognized a duty to design more coun-
terfeit resistant product and packaging.s7
571 Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 484; McCallister v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 164 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. W. Va.
2001).
572 W. VA. CODE §30-5-12(a) (2010).
5 Thomas v. Wyeth, 2005 WL 3754203, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. June 16, 2005); In re Rezulin
Products Liability Litigation, 133 F.Supp.2d 272, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying West Virginia
law); but see Walker v. Rite Aid of W. Va., Inc., 2003 WL 24215831, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 14,
2003) (immunity limited to "quality" of product; statute does not immunize warning claims).
574 No. 35500, S.E.2d__ 2010 WL 4709084 (W. Va. Nov. 18, 2010) (per curiam).
57 Id
576 See Ashworth v. Albers, 410 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (finding no duty to design
more counterfeit resistant product and packaging).
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7. The WVCCPA does not Apply to Actions Brought by Consum-
ers in Regard to Prescription Drug Purchases
In White v. Wyeth , the court faced a certified question regarding
whether a plaintiff was required to prove reliance as part of a WVCCPA claim.
The court, in an opinion authored by Justice McHugh, found that "when the
alleged deceptive conduct or practice involves affirmative misrepresentations,
reliance on such misrepresentations must be proven in order to satisfy the requi-
site causal connection."57 8 As part of that analysis, the court also found that
"[t]he private cause of action afforded consumers under [West Virginia Code
section] 46A-6-106(a) (2005) does not extend to prescription drug purchas-
es."5 79 The basis for the court's finding that prescription drug cases were not
encompassed within the statute was the following: (a) consumers are protected
by the intervention of the physician in the "decision-making process necessi-
tated by his or her exercise of judgment whether or not to prescribe a particular
medication[, which] protects consumers in ways respecting efficacy that are
lacking in advertising campaigns for other products"580; and (b) regulation by
the FDA of drugs "attenuates the effect product marketing has on a "consumer's
prescriptive drug purchasing decision."581
Obviously, it's hard to square the logic of Karl5 82 (that direct-to-
consumer advertising has so altered the traditional doctor patient relationship
that it is inappropriate to apply the learned intermediary doctrine) and White
(that the traditional doctor patient relationship protects the consumer from frau-
dulent and deceptive false statements in advertising of prescription medications
to such a degree that the WVCCPA does not apply). However, it is clear that
White was seen by the court as not overruling Karl, as the court's opinion cites
Karl as defining the standard in products liability cases as opposed to cases
brought pursuant to the WVCCPA.58 4
8. Inappropriateness for Class Certification
Frequently, plaintiffs counsel choose to file drug and medical device
cases in the form of class actions pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23. Although the permutations of these cases are beyond the scope of this
5 No. 35296,_ S.E.2d __, 2010 WL 5140048 (W. Va. Dec. 17, 2010).
578 Syl. pt. 5, id.
5 Syl. pt. 6, id.
580 Id. (quoting New Jersey Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 842 A.2d 174 (N.J. Su-
per. 2003), cert. denied, 837 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 2003)).
581 Id
582 State ex rel Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 899 (W. Va. 2007).
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Article (and frequently involve issues related to medical monitoring), it is estab-
lished law in most jurisdictions that the personal injury component of such cases
will almost never be appropriate for class certification.
Although there are no dispositive cases on this issue from the Supreme
Court of Appeals, there are opinions from the circuit courts addressing this pre-
cise issue. In Johnson v. Ethicon, Kanawha County Circuit Court Judge Kauf-
man confronted the issue of whether a class could be certified regarding injuries
alleged to derive from recalled surgical sutures. 8 s Judge Kaufman held that
such cases could not be certified: "Traditionally, class certification of claims for
personal injury is extremely rare and many courts and commentators conclude
that class certification in personal injury products liability cases, is almost never
appropriate." 86 This is the overwhelming majority position and in the few cases
that hold otherwise, there is usually some issue specific to that litigation that
587differentiates that case.
Generally, a plaintiff cannot force a defendant to translate documents,
such as design documents, from a different language into English. That is not to
say that the defendant may not want the documents translated for purposes of
their defense. Given the often broad scope and cost of discovery, the question is
often whether to impose the cost of translation upon the defendant.
585 Johnson v. Ethicon, et al., 2005 WL 3968820 (Kan. Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2005).
586 Id. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, KLONOFF'S CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 75-76 (3d ed. 2007) (collecting cases); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advi-
sory committee's note (1966) (cautioning that mass accidents do not lend themselves to class
certification). See also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 1996); Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995);
Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 270 (2d Cir. 1999) (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis in [Amchem] "sharply curtailed the ability to certify a class action pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3) in the mass tort context"); Valentina v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir.
1996) ("The history of class action certifications and products liability cases in this circuit and
elsewhere has not been luminous."); Neeley v. Ethicon, 2001 WL 1090204, at *10 (2001) ("In
medical devise [sic] products liability litigation, individual factual and legal issues often differ
dramatically because there is no common cause of injury.").
587 An example of a case in which certification of claims for personal injury resulting from the
use of a medical device was found appropriate was Telectronics. In Telectronics, the court faced
allegedly defective pace makers with a signature defect "a broken 'J'-lead." The Telectronics
court observed that the high rate of failure of the leads-12% to 25 0/-showed that physician
error or other alternative causes were unlikely to affect many claims. In re Teletronics Pacing
Systems, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 288-90 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Another unique characteristic of the
Telectronics litigation was that the type of injury for which plaintiffs sought recovery-injury
from a broken pacemaker lead-was readily apparent, not likely to have been caused by anything
else, and identifiable with a simple screening procedure. Id. The Telectronics court noted that
these circumstances set that case apart from other medical products liability actions' "The 'J' lead
controversy appears to be the exception to the general rule that medical products liability actions
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West Virginia typically follows the American Rule, under which each
side bears its own costs of litigation." In the leading case dealing with the cost
of translation, the First Circuit, applying the American Rule, granted mandamus
and reversed an order compelling two parties that did business in foreign lan-
guages (Japanese and Spanish) to translate their documents into English for the
benefit of opposing counsel.189 The only published case that finds that a foreign
corporation must translate its documents into English is Stapleton v. Kawasaki
Heavy Industries Ltd.5 90
Indeed, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia, in comparing the reasoning of Stapleton with that of Puerto Rico
Electric, held that "[t]he better-reasoned view ... is that the Plaintiffs must bear
[the translation] expense" at the pretrial stage of litigation. 59' In Cook, the plain-
tiffs were not West Virginians and the German company at issue was a foreign
corporation not doing business in the United States. 592 Volkswagen was brought
into the litigation via the Hague Convention.593 Plaintiffs were attempting to
avoid the considerable expense of having documents produced by Volkswagen
and in the German language translated to the English language.594
588 But see Syl. pt. 4, Bowling v. Ansted Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 425 S.E.2d 144 (W.
Va. 1992) (exception for cases involving fraudulent conduct).
589 In re Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 506 (1st Cir. 1982). See also Contretas
v. Isuzu Motors, No. Civ.SA-98-CA-442-JWP, 1999 WL 33290667, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
1999) ("[T]here is no authority for compelling the defendants to translate discovery documents
. . . . .); Soto v. McLean, Nos. 7:96CV134BR2, 7:96CV135BR2, 1998 WL 1110688, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 1998) (same rule as to translations of deposition transcripts); East Boston
Ecumenical Comty. Council, Inc. v. Mastrorillo, 124 F.R.D. 14, 15 (D. Mass. 1989) (same rule as
to foreign language interpreters at depositions); Howes v. Med. Components, Inc., 698 F. Supp.
574, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (parties "cannot be compelled to translate foreign language documents
for the benefit of their adversary"); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 463 (D. Utah 1985)
(the "Federal Rules make no provision for lingual translations"); Lear v. N.Y. Helicopter Corp.,
597 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) ("[A] party may not be compelled to procure a
translation of a foreign-language document which it discloses during discovery . . . ."); Krygier v.
Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("[A] party cannot be compelled to
translate a discoverable document and that it is sufficient to produce the original untranslated
document .... ); In re Fialuridne (FIAU) Prods. Liab. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 386, 387 (D. D.C. 1995)
("[A] party cannot impose the cost of translating documents that exist in a foreign language on the
producing party .... ); JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 34.14[5] (3d ed.
2007) ("If a document that is required to be produced is in a foreign language and no English
version exists, the producing party should not be required to translate the document into English at
its own expense."); AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY § 53:102, at 210 (3d ed. 2008) ("[A]
court is without authority to compel a party to provide translated documents in the first in-
stance.").
s9 69 F.R.D. 489 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
591 Cook v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 101 F.R.D. 92, 92 (S.D. W. Va. 1984).
592 Id
593 Id
5 Id. (quotations omitted).
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H. Other Similar Incident (OSI) Evidence
Often times, a party, usually a plaintiff, will seek to introduce "other
similar incidents" in product liability trials. West Virginia recognizes this type
of evidence, but limits such evidence consistent with West Virginia Rule of
Evidence 404(b), the requirement of "substantial similarity" 595and the discre-
tion afforded the trial judge pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Evidence 403.596
While the substantial similarity requirement limits other incident evidence, the
court will first look to the purpose of the evidence under Rule 404(b).m
Rule 404(b) is a strict exclusionary rule, and it states that evidence of
other alleged acts or wrongs is not admissible to prove character or propensity to
perform an action. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. 59 8
The court will make inquiry to insure that this type of evidence is not
being introduced for an improper purpose. In the products liability context, it is
typically only the "notice" or "knowledge" exception to Rule 404(b) that per-
mits a substantially similar incident to be introduced into evidence. According-
ly, to be evidence of notice or knowledge of a defect, the OSI will need to be an
incident that occurred prior to both the accident in question and the manufacture
date of the product.
Typically, a court will require reasonable advance notice of the intent to
use such evidence and will conduct a separate hearing to consider the admissi-
bility of the evidence. Courts also are wary that other incident evidence may
create a "mini-trial" about that other incident, which can confuse and distract the
jury from the matter about which they are to decide. Evidence of other acts is
not only excluded because it lacks probative value, but also as a precaution
"against inciting undue prejudice and permitting the introduction of pointless
collateral issues." 99
59s Syl. pt. 3, Gable v. Kroger, 410 S.E.2d 701 (1991) ("Evidence of injuries occurring under
different circumstances or conditions is not admissible. . . .") The Gable formulation of "substan-
tial similarity" is also very narrow. In Gable, the court found the prior slip and fall accidents that
Mr. Gable wished to introduce were not substantially similar to the subject accident, as one oc-
curred over two years before the subject accident, and the other was in a different part of the store
and was caused by an overflow of water from malfunctioning equipment. On the other hand, the
subject accident was a slip and fall caused by some spilled cottage cheese. Id.
596 See syl. pt. 4, Id.
m See id. at 704.
5 Id.; W.VA. R. OF EviD. 404(b).
59 FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 4-5(A)
at 141 (4th ed. 2000); W. VA. R. OF EvID. 404(b); see also TXO Production v. Alliance Resources,
419 S.E.2d 870, 882-83 (1992).
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I. Economic Loss Doctrine
West Virginia does recognize the economic loss doctrine except in cases
involving a sudden calamitous event. Damages which result from a "bad bar-
gain" are outside the scope of strict liability and the purchaser's remedy is
through the UCC.600 However, "property damage to a defective product which
results from a sudden "calamitous event" is recoverable under a strict liability
cause of action."6 0 1
IX. CONCLUSION
In the three decades since Morningstar, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has addressed many issues relating to the substantive products
liability law in West Virginia. Despite the importance of this area of the law
and the prolific number of products suits filed every year, Morningstar remains
the single most important products liability case and its interpretation and appli-
cation are fought over on a daily basis throughout our court system.
It is our hope that this Article will provide the bench and bar in our
State with a reliable starting point for navigating this complex and rapidly
evolving field of law. If any lawyers practicing in this area of the law want to
discuss any aspect of this article or offer any suggestions for how it can be im-
proved in future iterations, please contact us.
6 Syl. pt. 1, Capitol Fuels Inc. v. Clark Equip., 382 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1982) (citing syl. pt.
3, Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 854 (W. Va. 1982)).
601 Syl. pt. 3, Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d at 854.
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